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This dissertation documents and evaluates certain financial and non-financial strategies 
used by the public accounting profession to influence audit regulation during the policy 
formation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  The dissertation is 
comprised of three separate, but related studies.  Each study uses prior research in 
accounting and related disciplines to investigate significant aspects the profession’s 
strategies.  The first study evaluates the rationality and effectiveness of political action 
committee (PAC) contributions paid by the accounting profession to members of 
Congress.  The study finds that the accounting profession rationally allocated more PAC 
contributions to top congressional leaders and to members of committees having 
jurisdiction over SOX.  The study also finds that the accounting profession allocated 
more PAC contributions to legislators with a history of pro-business roll call voting 
behavior and to candidates in close electoral races.  This evidence suggests that the 
profession is motivated to contribute cash to legislators in order to gain access to lobby 
and to influence the ideological composition of the legislature. A voting model also finds 
a positive relationship in two instances between PAC contributions and roll call voting 
favorable to the economic interests of the profession in the House of Representatives. 
 
The second study evaluates the effect of these PAC contributions on Committee 
members’ frequency and mode of speech during public hearings related to SOX.  Using 





between PAC contributions and speech performance.  The study also finds differential 
uses of modals and certain verbs between legislators depending upon party affiliation. 
 
The third paper explores the rhetoric of the accounting profession’s public interest ideal 
and the profession’s motivation to invoke public interest arguments in various contexts.  I 
approach my analysis from three different perspectives.  The first perspective analyzes 
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric.  The second 
approach eschews any well-intentioned motivations on behalf of the profession and casts 
public interest arguments as propaganda cloaking self-interested action.  The third 
approach deconstructs the public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to document and evaluate political strategies and 
tactics used by the public accounting profession and those of its constituents during the 
policy formation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 (SOX).  The dissertation is 
comprised of three separate, but related studies.  Each study uses prior research in 
accounting and related disciplines to investigate significant aspects the profession’s 
strategies.  In this introductory chapter, I provide the overall motivation for the 
dissertation and a brief summary of each study. 
 
The maintained assumption of American society is that securities regulation fosters fair 
and efficient capital markets by protecting investors from unfair and fraudulent practices 
while maintaining investor confidence in those markets.  Arguably, the persuasive appeal 
of this rationale rests on providing the public equal access to the American Dream.  
According to Merino and Mayper (2001), the American Dream is a combination of 
Jeffersonian democracy, where all citizens have an equal opportunity to succeed, and 
social Darwinism, a theory that justifies discrepancies in the distribution of wealth based 
on performance.  In other words, the American Dream promises “an equal opportunity to 
be unequal” (p.506).  According to this dream, legal and political structures should 
protect equal access and opportunity, as well as personal property rights accumulated 






Another view, known as the Iron Law of Oligopoly, claims that society has a natural 
tendency towards rule by the few (Michels, 1915).  According to this theory, large 
populations tend to specialize and delegate decision making to a few individuals who 
naturally accumulate their own wealth and protect or enhance their power base.  
Economic theories of regulation seem to support this view suggesting that powerful 
interest groups seek control of regulatory structures for the economic benefit of their 
members and to the detriment of broader segments of society (Stigler, 1971; Pelzman, 
1976; Hirschleifer, 1976; Becker, 1986; Willmott; 1986; Sikka, 2001; Dwyer and 
Roberts, 2004).  Under this view, securities legislation such as SOX, can be seen as a 
symbolic attempt to restore investor confidence and preserve the status quo following a 
series of major market failures. At worst, SOX might be seen as an instrumental attempt 
by politicians and regulators to exploit a crisis in order to protect their power base and 
enhance their own interests.  
 
SOX contained sweeping provisions affecting the responsibilities of publicly traded 
companies and their auditors.  Principal among these was the creation of a Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that effectively stripped the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) of its ability to regulate itself and set 
auditing standards2.  This legislation is important since it signaled an important shift 
away from the self-regulatory structure established under the Securities and Exchange 





U.S. public accounting profession in auditing the financial statements of publicly traded 
companies.  In exchange for this state-granted monopoly, the profession ostensibly 
agreed to a fiduciary role infused with a mandate to operate in the public interest. This 
role requires auditors to operate as independent, competent and objective referees 
overseeing the production of financial information while performing their services under 
strict professional standards (Roberts and Kurtenbach, 1998).  Classic economic theory 
suggests this role is necessary because the proper functioning of capital markets requires 
investor confidence in the accuracy, completeness and reliability of the financial 
information generated by publicly traded companies.  In addition, since accounting and 
auditing standards are complex, a condition of information asymmetry exists between 
consumers and producers of financial information.  To the extent that uninformed 
consumers cannot evaluate the quality of financial information might subject them to 
incompetence and fraud. Since the public cannot be reasonably expected to investigate 
the qualifications of auditors, professional licensing acts as a symbol of quality and 
presumably, protects the public from harm. Licensing also acts as a quality signal to 
regulators enhancing the value of CPAs to their clients. Ayers, Jackson and Hite (1989) 
found that licensing provided CPAs with a degree of protection and negotiating power in 
practicing before the IRS allowing them to adopt more aggressive, pro-taxpayer positions 
in ambiguous tax situations.   
 
Some theorists however, have been critical of this arrangement, citing the potential for 





industries end up dominating the regulatory structure for the economic benefit of their 
members.  Stigler’s economic theory of regulation (1971) suggests that industries and 
occupations with sufficient political power will utilize the State to seek control of entry 
and enact complimentary legislation in order to maximize their wealth.  Pelzman (1976) 
formalized this theory and predicted that political equilibrium will result when regulation 
balances the marginal costs and benefits among the various interest groups affected.  
Hirschleifer (1976) observed that regulators themselves are an interested group and that 
when exogenous events disrupt an existing political equilibrium regulators tend to assure 
that the associated costs (or benefits) of the correction are distributed among all parties. 
Becker (1986) further refined this theory by including the consuming public as a 
competing interest group. Taken in combination, these theories suggest that when 
exogenous events occur, such as stock market crashes and major audit failures, the 
political and regulatory structures undergo a correction wherein the rational and self-
interested members of various interest groups, including the accounting profession, 
compete for relative economic advantage.  Such a correction it seems occurred following 
the collapse of Enron4. The magnitude and widespread impact of the losses demanded a 
response from the political sector and battle lines were quickly drawn among the various 
interest groups with an economic stake in the outcome.  These interest groups included 
the accounting profession and their clients, federal regulators, institutional investors, 
stock exchanges, the investment and consumer banking industry, labor organizations, 
consumers and even the politicians themselves.  Consequently, drawing on Stigler’s 





the accounting profession acted instrumentally in seeking to protect its economic interests 
and those of its constituents during the policy formulation period of SOX.   
 
While on the surface, SOX appears to have diminished the profession’s ability to self-
regulate, it also appears to have contained hidden benefits for the accounting industry.   
For example, SOX provides accountants with more opportunities for fee generation by 
requiring a broader scope of attestation responsibilities, and reduces audit risk for 
accountants by more explicitly placing the onus for accurate financial reporting upon 
management.  A study by Financial Executives International (2004) reported that 
compliance with section 404 alone, concerning the documentation of internal accounting 
controls, would increase external audit fees by an average of 38%, or $1.5 million per 
company for the largest US Companies. Multiplying this amount by the 321 companies in 
the survey indicates an increase of about a half a billion dollars in audit fees for the 
profession.  A cottage industry addressing the need for compliance with SOX has also 
created unprecedented demand for accounting skills among students, boosting the salaries 
for entry level accounting professors to a level on par with many medical school 
professors (Gullapalli, 2004).  Gullapalli (2004) goes so far as to say that after all the 
publicity, students now perceive an exciting, “Elliot Ness-like” quality to accounting, 
reminiscent of the FBI during the Depression.  SOX also reduces audit risk for CPA’s 
since CEO’s must now personally attest to the accuracy of their financial statements and 
the strength of their internal control systems under threat of significant penalties.  These 





time for failures and restatements.  As a result, SOX appears to have solidified and 
strengthened the professional status of CPAs.  
 
Whether these hidden benefits were instrumentally or serendipitously included in SOX 
by legislators allied to the profession is a question worthy of investigation.  Willmott 
(1986; pp.556) states that professional accountancy associations are “primarily, but not 
exclusively, political bodies whose purpose is to define, organise, secure and advance the 
interests of their (most vocal and influential) members.”  Dwyer and Roberts (2004) 
assert that the accounting profession is too closely aligned with the interest of large 
multinational companies and that the profession exerts too much influence over U.S. 
government policy.  These sentiments are also echoed by other researchers concerned 
that the inherently acquisitive nature and substantial political influence wielded by the 
profession and its supporters legitimizes and sustains inequitable social structures 
privileging particular interest groups to the detriment of society as a whole (Sikka, 2001; 
Willmott and Sikka, 1997).   
 
Empirical evidence in accounting research supports these concerns indicating a positive 
relationship between the relative interest group strength of the profession and the 
enactment of complimentary legislation. Young (1991) documented a positive 
relationship between the relative interest-group strength of CPAs, measured by their 
numbers relative to non-CPAs, and restrictive licensing regimes among state public 





150 hour accounting education requirement was directly related to the ratio of state 
licensed CPAs to non-CPAs and to the percentage of CPAs belonging to their State’s 
society of CPAs.  Donabedian (1991) found that licensing requirements for CPAs were 
stricter in states with greater numbers of large businesses.  Young (1988) found that prior 
to the initiation of the Advisory Grading Service, CPA exam failure rates in California 
and Illinois were associated with changes in economic conditions.  These results suggest 
that CPAs as an interest group engage in restrictive licensing practices in order to protect 
the economic welfare of its members.  
 
Other researchers have documented the strategies and tactics used by the accounting 
profession and its constituents to influence regulation at the federal level (Dwyer and 
Roberts, 2004; Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003).  Roberts, 
Dwyer and Sweeney (2003) documented a variety of strategies used by the accounting 
profession to influence federal legislation related to auditor liability reform. Using 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of political strategies, Roberts et al (2003) concluded 
that accounting firms and professional organizations have generally adopted a long-term 
relational approach for influencing the political process that spans multiple issues.  
Accounting firms participated individually and collectively through professional 
organizations making extensive use of informational and financial incentive tactics and 
modest use of constituency building tactics.  According to Hillman and Hitt, (1999), 
informational strategies seek to affect policy reform by providing policy makers 





Examples of possible tactics used in an informational strategy include direct lobbying 
efforts, reporting the results of research and surveys, providing expert testimony and 
submitting white papers or technical reports.  Financial strategies seek to align the 
interests of the policy makers with those of the industry by using monetary incentives.  
Tactics used in a financial strategy might include campaign contributions, either directly 
from an individual or through a political action committee, paying travel expenses and 
honoraria for speaking engagements and hiring politician’s relatives or subordinates as 
paid political consultants. A constituency building strategy attempts to build support for 
desired legislation from the “bottom-up” by influencing voter beliefs through tactics of 
advertising, slogans, press releases or other public relations programs. Roberts, et al 
(2003) further tested for the effectiveness of these strategies on roll call voting, and found 
a significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC) contributions 
by the accounting profession to committee members and roll call voting behavior 
favorable to the interests of the industry.   
 
Dwyer and Roberts (2004) analyzed the political contributions made by the accounting 
profession to legislators during the 1997-1998 federal election cycle and found that the 
profession shows a preference for legislators with conservative, pro-business ideologies. 
Roberts and Bobek (2004) tested the relationship between corporate PAC contributions 
and legislators ability to affect tax law changes. Their evidence indicates that large 
corporations used PAC contributions in an apparent effort to negotiate contracts with the 





products.  These studies provide strong evidence that accounting firms, both individually 
and collectively have been making extensive use of lobbying and PAC contributions in 
efforts to influence legislation favorable to the profession and its constituents.    
 
This stream of research is important in order to document the extent to which sectional 
interest groups, such as the accounting profession, influence the political process 
concerning legislation having a direct economic impact on its members. To the extent 
that the accounting profession has been effective in transferring wealth to its members 
through political activity or influence undermines its public interest mandate and 
challenges the rationale for providing it monopoly status.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF STUDIES 
The purpose of the first study is to determine whether the political contributions paid by 
the accounting profession to Congress were rational and effective in protecting or 
promoting the economic interests of the profession during the formulation of SOX.  The 
study documents the monetary contributions paid by the political action committees 
(PACS) of the AICPA and Big 5 accounting firms to members of the House of 
Representatives and Senate and develops a model to test for any relationship between 
these payments and membership on committees having jurisdiction over SOX.  The study 
extends previous research by evaluating the rationality of PAC contributions paid by the 





regulation. The working hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between PAC 
contributions paid by the accounting profession and legislators membership on those 
committees having jurisdiction over audit regulation.  
 
The first stage of the analysis tests the relationship between PAC contributions and SOX 
relevant committee membership while controlling for political ideology, electoral 
competition, leadership position and membership on related committees.  The SOX 
relevant committees include the House Committee on Financial Services chaired by 
Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-OH), and the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs chaired by Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD)5.  The general 
specification for the model is linear, with PAC contributions as the dependent variable. 
The results indicate that the accounting profession rationally allocated relatively higher 
levels of financial resources to pro-business legislators, members of committees having 
jurisdiction over issues relevant to the profession, including the committees with 
jurisdiction over SOX and to members engaged in close electoral races.    
 
In the second stage of the analysis, the working hypothesis is that legislators repay such 
political debts with favorable roll call voting behavior.  Recent research in accounting has 
found a significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC) 
contributions by the profession to legislators and roll call voting behavior limiting 
accountants liability in securities litigation (Roberts, et al, 2003).  This finding suggests 





concerning audit regulation, especially when public salience of the issue is low.  In a 
further test of this relationship, I test of the effectiveness of PAC contributions in 
influencing legislators voting behavior using a probit regression model while controlling 
for political ideology and party loyalty. The dependent variable is dichotomous, 
representing affirmative or negative votes on amendments or motions relevant to the 
accounting profession.  
 
The final roll call vote on SOX was unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the 
House, so the analysis focuses on roll call votes concerning amendments relevant to the 
accounting profession.  The results of the analysis in the House indicate a positive 
association between PAC contributions and roll call voting behavior favorable to the 
interests of the accounting profession on at least two amendments relevant to the 
profession. There was no statistical association between PAC contributions and roll call 
voting behavior in the Senate. 
 
In an attempt to bring in alternative empirical approaches and evidence into the debate 
concerning PAC contributions and policy formation, the second study adopts a linguistic 
perspective. This perspective assumes that language mediates audit policy formulation, 
and that distributors of PAC money should favor legislators allied with the accounting 
profession who use persuasive language during public debate.  Adopting an empirical 
linguistic approach opens up new avenues of investigation in the analysis of the political 





In this study, I evaluate the association between PAC contributions and legislator’s 
speech performance. The working hypothesis is that legislators receiving PAC money 
reciprocate by arguing more frequently and emphatically on issues in favor of the 
profession.  Overall, the results suggest there was a positive association between PAC 
contributions and speech among Republican committee members in the House.  
However, the association between PAC contributions among Non-republicans was not 
significant in either the House or the Senate committee hearings.   
 
The third paper in this dissertation represents a philosophical discussion of the accounting 
profession with respect to its public interest mandate and questions whether the rhetoric 
of the accounting profession is consistent with the behavior of its members. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine the nature of the public interest ideal as promulgated by the 
public accounting profession in the United States and explore what motivates the 
profession to invoke public interest arguments in various contexts.  In so doing, I also 
explore the elasticity and ambivalence of the term public interest while arguing that it is 
in and of itself part of the mystification process used by the profession to maintain its 
self-regulatory status.  
 
I approach my analysis from three different perspectives.  The first perspective analyzes 
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric.  I define 
rhetoric in the traditional Aristotelian sense, i.e. as persuasive appeals based on logic, 





public interest model of the professions.  I illustrate how the profession uses the rhetoric 
of the public interest as a measure of proper comportment for its members, to reassure 
regulators and the investing public of the benevolent motivations of the profession, and to 
maintain the stability of global capital markets.  
 
The second approach adopts a critical perspective.   This view eschews any altruistic 
motivations on behalf of the profession and casts the language of the public interest as 
propaganda intended to support the economic objectives of professional elites in a highly 
concentrated monopolistic industry and those of their corporate clients.  Using examples, 
I illustrate the instrumental use of the public interest ideal by the accounting profession to 
defend its self-regulatory status in times of crisis, as justification to extend its 
jurisdictional claims and to minimize its exposure to liability from audit failures.   
 
The final perspective focuses on the ambivalence of language and attempts to reveal how 
the true nature of the public interest is ‘undecidable’.   This perspective deconstructs 
(Derrida, 1982) the public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of elements 
including cultural values, political doctrine and contingent interests. I use the term myth 
as both allegory and parable.  Myths are similar to allegory in the in the sense that they 
exist as symbolic representations for meanings other than those indicated on the surface.  
They are also similar to parables, being fictitious stories illustrating historically 
embedded moral attitudes. I rely on myths as the symbolic representations of an ideal 





interest ideal and the inherent instability between what is written and what is read, or 
what is spoken and what is heard.   A deconstructive reading of the public interest ideal 
reveals how its central meaning is always on the move, uniquely reified by readers in 
context, and how any fixed meaning cannot be sustained.  I believe that this paper 
advances prior critical work because I focus on the instrumental use of the public interest 
ideal as a rhetorical strategy while acknowledging and addressing the differences in 




Each of the three papers presented in this dissertation highlights an alternative ontological 
and epistemological perspective.  The first study evaluates the rationality and 
effectiveness of PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession with respect to 
legislation concerning audit regulation by documenting cash paid and votes cast.  Using 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) descriptions of paradigms, the PAC study is functionalist 
given that the held assumptions are ontologically realist and the epistemology is positive 
science.  This view assumes that external circumstances condition individuals and their 
behavior.  
 
The second study introduces some subjectivity into the analysis by using thematic coding 





speech performance. Investigating the discourse of legislators in the context of 
congressional committee hearings and testing for a relationship between speech 
performance and financial support from the accounting profession opens new avenues of 
research semantic analysis that can be applied to a variety of accounting narratives 
including annual reports, note disclosures, Chairman’s statements and SEC filings. 
 
The philosophical stance of the third and final study of this dissertation is critical.  It is 
amethodical in its approach and ambivalent with respect to whether first or third person 
conscious experiences are real.  The study evaluates the rhetoric of the accounting 
profession with respect to its public interest mandate using three fundamentally different 
perspectives.  The first perspective assumes the rhetoric is driven by functional pluralistic 
motivations and evaluates the public interest discourse using traditional modes of 
persuasion, i.e. logical, emotional and authoritative.  The second perspective adopts a 
more critical approach that portrays the rhetoric of the public interest as a glittering and 
virtuous generality linked to the highly valued ideals of self-sacrifice and benevolence 
while obfuscating underlying instrumental motivations.  The third and final approach 
deconstructs the public interest ideal to reveal the simultaneous and contradictory 
attitudes present in the discourse highlighting the inherent instability between what is 
written and what is read, or what is spoken and what is heard.   
 
In summary, this dissertation portrays three studies in accounting along a continuum of 





The methods used range from the precise and quantitative to the fuzzy and qualitative. I 
believe that accounting research can benefit from these alternative perspectives because 
the practice of accounting is inherently humanistic, incorporating fields of sociology, 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 more formally known as HR3763, the Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 (CAARTA) became Public Law 107-204 on 
July 30, 2002 after a unanimous vote of in the Senate (99-0) and a near unanimous vote in the House (423-
3).  HR3763 was sponsored by Representative Michael G. Oxley, R-OH, and incorporated S2673, the 
Public Company Accounting reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 sponsored by Senator Paul S. 
Sarbanes, D-MD.  
2   Title I established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to “…establish or adopt, 
or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the 
preparation of audit reports for issuers, in accordance with section 103.2”  Section 103 provided the 
PCAOB wide latitude in seeking standard setting direction from outside sources, including, but not limited 
to the accounting profession.  However, the PCAOB ultimately decided not to delegate this standard setting 
authority to the accounting profession. On April 18, 2003 the board issued Release 2003-5 “Statement 
regarding establishment of accounting standards” stating:  
“The Board has, however, determined not to exercise the authority afforded it in Section 103 to designate 
or recognize any professional group of accountants to propose standards.  This release generally describes 
the manner in which the Board intends to discharge these responsibilities and proposes PCAOB Rule 3700, 
which would govern the formation, composition and role of the advisory group in the Board’s standard 
setting process.”   
The potential significance of this release was commented on in the September 2003 issue of The CPA 
Journal (NYSCPA): “On Wednesday, the new oversight board voted to formally strip the [AICPA] of its 
authority to set auditing standards, retaining that power for itself. The decision is a further blow to the 
institute, the accounting professions leading trade group. This conclusion is in sharp contrast to what the 
first group of SEC commissioners determined at their initial meeting. That first group of commissioners 
decided to rely on the “profession” for rules and self-regulation.” 
3 The Securities Act of 1933 requires securities issuers and others to register with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and set standards for disclosure for publicly traded securities, specifically requiring 
registrants to file audited financial statement information certified by an independent public or certified 
accountant. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 delegated responsibility for enforcement to the SEC.  The 
SEC was given statutory authority to set accounting standards, however it typically looked to the private 
sector for leadership in this endeavor. 
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4 What followed the collapse of Enron has been called a witch-hunt as a variety of interest groups accused 
each other of being implicated or responsible for the scandals.  However, attention quickly focused on 
Arthur Andersen, LLP, Enron’s auditor of sixteen years.  The SEC set up a special Enron task force on 
December 17, 2001, the day following Enron’s press release announcing a $618 million net loss for the 
third quarter of 2001 and a $1.2 billion write-down of Enron shareholder equity. The task force 
immediately sent a written request to Arthur Andersen for Enron related documents.   The court record 
indicates that Andersen engaged in large scale document shredding until it received a formal subpoena 
from the SEC on November 8, 2001.  These actions ultimately contributed to the demise of the revered 
‘Big 5’ accounting firm.  On March 7, 2002, Arthur Andersen, LLP was indicted in the US District Court, 
Southern District of Texas on for obstruction of justice, a charge it was convicted of on June 15, 2002 and 
sentenced to 5 years probation with a $500,000 fine.  In August 2002, the state of Texas stripped Andersen 





                                                                                                                                                 
5 The defection of Senator Jim Jeffords (I-VT) from the Republican party during the 107th Congress shifted 
the balance of power in the Senate from 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans to 50 Democrats, 49 




I) STUDY ONE -  
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND PAC 




The conventional wisdom on the influence of money in politics suggests that it 
undermines the twin pillars of the democratic process: representation and participation. 
First, it assumes that interested money can buy legislative favors and/or elective offices.  
If this is true, then interested money in politics undermines the equality of the one person, 
one vote system and skews political representation in the legislature towards the wealthy. 
A corollary to this view is that public disgust with the influence of money in politics 
causes voters to withdraw from the democratic process. Critics point out that voter 
turnout has dropped as the level of campaign spending has increased over the last several 
years.  However, much to the chagrin of researchers, empirical evidence of a causal link 
between campaign contributions and legislative favors has been difficult to find.  
 
A competing view is that in any democracy governed by majority rule, there will be 
disenfranchised minorities.  The important issue is determining the best way to minimize 




person, one vote) assumes that all persons have an equal stake in a specific outcome and 
that the intensity of their interests is the same.  Clearly, this is not the case.  Mechanisms 
exist in representative democracy to adjust for these differences by giving more or less 
weight to the needs of the minorities.  To the extent that interested money from 
minorities, such as accountants, can influence the leaders and legislative agendas of 
special committees, gives them a disproportionate voice in the political process, but this 
may be justified since accountants are a minority and may have more at stake in the 
legislative outcome. 
 
In this study, I draw on extant economic theories of regulation and political economy to 
undertake an examination of PAC contributions made by the accounting profession to 
Congress during the policy formulation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and evaluate 
their effectiveness in influencing the voting behavior of Congress.  Recent empirical 
work focused on the magnitude and nature of the accounting profession’s influence in 
federal politics indicate that the both the accounting profession and its corporate sponsors 
have successfully used PAC contributions to negotiate favorable economic contracts with 
the state (Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003).  Roberts and 
Bobek (2004) tested for the significance of the relationship between corporate PAC 
contributions and legislators ability to affect tax law changes. Their evidence indicates 
that large corporations used PAC contributions in attempts to negotiate contracts with the 
state concerning legislation directly affecting their tax burden or the demand for their 
products. Roberts, et al (2003) found a significant positive correlation between political 




members and roll call voting behavior on liability reform favorable to the interests of the 
industry. Dwyer and Roberts (2004) analyzed the political contributions made by the 
accounting profession to legislators during the 1997-1998 federal election cycle and 
found that the profession shows a preference for legislators with conservative, pro-
business ideologies.  These studies reveal a statistically significant linkage between PAC 
contributions and policy formulation suggesting that the U.S. public accounting 
profession and its corporate sponsors use financial incentives to influence policy 
formulation having a material impact on their members.  These studies also challenge the 
pluralistic assumption that political power of sectional interest groups in the U.S. is 
widely diffused implying business interests now dominate the U.S. federal political 
process.  This study extends this stream of research by examining the political influence 





Economic theories of regulation predict that powerful special interest groups will try to 
capture the legislative process in order to promote the economic welfare of their 
members.  According to these theories, regulated industries, such as the accounting 
profession, seek complimentary legislation to restrict entry into their industry and/or 




Hirschleifer, 1976, Becker, 1986; Roberts and Kurtenbach, 1998; Donabedian, 1991; 
Young, 1991). According to Stigler (1971), industries that seek such complimentary 
regulation from the state must be willing to pay with two things that legislators need: 
votes and resources.  This conjecture is consistent with theories of political economy that 
assert politicians seek both monetary and non-monetary resources to promote their 
conception of good policy, get re-elected and gain the recognition of their legislative 
peers (Leyden, 1995; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi, 2002).  Monetary resources can 
come in the form of direct cash contributions, subsidized expenses or honorariums for 
speaking engagement and other services. Non-monetary resources may take the form of 
blocs of votes, policy expertise and influence over important economic and legislative 
actors.  The costs to politicians associated with attracting these resources come in two 
general varieties.  The first cost is the potential loss of votes or other resources by shifting 
policies in favor of the contributing group and alienating others. A second cost may be 
the disutility suffered by the politician in expending effort to perform services for a 
contributing group rather than engaging in other personally preferable legislative 
activities.  
 
Contributors, on the other hand, may give resources for at least two reasons.  The first 
reason is to gain access to existing politicians. The access hypothesis does not necessarily 
stipulate that interest groups pay contributions to affect policy.  Quid pro quo exchanges 
of votes for money are illegal under bribery statutes and both legislators and contributors 
have incentives to avoid any such appearances.  Rather, it suggests that contributions are 




an issue (de Figueiredo, 2002).  Once an interest group gains access to a legislator, they 
can engage in a more valuable activity, namely lobbying.  The correlation between PAC 
contributions and lobbying expenditures is quite high. Ansolabehere, et al, (2002) found 
that 70% of all lobbying expenditures and 86% of all PAC contributions come from a 
small fraction (20%) of interest groups that have both PACs and lobbyists.  Groups 
without PACs tend to spend little on lobbying.   
 
Another reason special interest groups contribute resources is to support the incumbency 
of legislators with similar political agendas and/or change the composition of the 
legislature to one that is more ideologically compatible with the interests of the group.  
Poole and Daniels (1985) found that political ideology explains 80% of all roll call voting 
with party loyalty explaining an additional 7%.  Consequently, lobbying legislators with 
similar political ideologies should be more cost effective since fewer units of access 
would be required to convince the legislator of the value of the preferred policy.  
According to this reasoning, powerful members, such as committee chairs, party leaders 
and pivotal legislators should also be able to sell more units of access at the going market 
price relative to other members because they are able to deliver effective service at a 
lower cost per unit of access (Ansolabehere, et al, 2002).    
 
While few doubt that PAC contributions are an important component of the political 
process, there is considerable debate concerning their purpose or effectiveness in 
influencing policy outcomes.  A significant amount of research in the political economy 




Primo and Groseclose, 2000; de Figueiredo, 2002).  The reasons given for this claim 
include the lack of a consistent link between PAC contributions and the activities of 
legislators and the relatively small amount of PAC contributions when compared to 
lobbying expenses or even philanthropic expenditures (Milyo, 2002).  According to this 
line of reasoning, PAC contributions may merely be evidence of symbolic gifts, such as 
fruit-baskets, intended to maintain ongoing relationships with legislators, rather than pay-
for-performance contracting. A recent meta-analysis by Roscoe and Jenkins (2005) of the 
impact of campaign contributions on roll call voting found that models with a measure 
controlling for ideology and more than one contributions variable were less likely to 
produce results. They concluded that about a third of the roll call votes exhibited an 
impact from contributions. These inconsistent results are not surprising given the illegal 
status of political pay-for-performance contracts.  Moreover, legislators often receive 
money from various industries with conflicting interests making such exchanges difficult 
if not impossible to consummate. The result is a convoluted and complex legislative 
process that tends to obscure the exact mechanisms of political contracting and hinders 
attempts to establish a direct linkage between cash payments and policy formulation. 
Major agreements are often brokered in private by legislators engaged in long-term 
logrolling activities, where votes on particular issues are given in exchange for past or 
future support on other issues.   
 
Recent evidence of a high correlation between lobbying expenditures and PAC 
contributions (Ansolabehere, et al., 2002) coupled with the absence of a demonstrable 




lobbying is also independent of policy outcomes.  This finding stands in contrast to 
numerous case studies suggesting that lobbying and information transfer greatly affect 
voting behavior in congress and influence administrative decisions (de Figueiredo, 2002).  
In fact, de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) found that the average return for a dollar of 
lobbying expenditure was $11 to $45 for universities represented by legislators on 
powerful appropriations committees.  Ansolabehere, et al. (2002) suggest that this 
apparent paradox may be resolved by disaggregating PAC contributions and lobbying 
expenditures and analyzing them by industry sector.  
 
POLITICAL SPENDING BY THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 
 
The Center for Responsive Politics1 reports that accountants contributed $15,354,0562 to 
federal candidates during the 2000 election cycle while spending $21,777,4323 on 
lobbying, a ratio of 1.4 to 1.  This ratio is significantly lower than the average 10 to 1 
ratio reported for all groups by Ansolabehere, et al. (2002).  The assumption is that 
groups with low lobby-PAC ratios place relatively less importance on access as opposed 
to supporting candidates with similar political ideologies. Groups with higher lobbying-
PAC ratios are assumed to be more interested in access for lobbying activities and tend to 
exhibit more balanced, bipartisan patterns of giving, ostensibly because the services they 





Empirical evidence indicates that accountants do show favoritism toward pro-business 
candidates giving on average, twice as much to Republican candidates than to democrats. 
(Dwyer and Roberts, 2004).   However, accountants can also gain ‘free’ access to 
legislators by paying in kind with policy expertise, thus reducing the need to buy access 
with PAC contributions.  The analysis in table I-1 shows that there is considerable 
variation in lobbying to PAC ratios among the major accounting firms and the AICPA, 
ranging from 1.4:1 to 7.8:1. Therefore, the relative ability of firms to gain free access and 
the relative importance of access versus ideology among firms may be firm specific.    
 
Table I-1. Ratio of Lobbying to PAC Contributions 

















Lobbying 4,365,000 1,145,000 2,800,000 1,020,000 1,860,000 3,836,297 15,026,297 
PAC 559,586 820,379 1,039,741 633,785 1,159,675 1,244,414 5,457,580 
1998 7.8 1.4 2.69 1.61 1.6 3.08 2.75 
         
Lobbying 4,320,000* 3,414,000 2,400,000 2,190,000 2,645,000 6,808,432 21,777,432 
PAC 762,999* 1,092,095 1,193,886 733,437 912,591 1,079,244 5,774,252 
2000 5.66* 3.13 2.01 2.99 2.9 6.31 3.77 
* Amounts represent only one year in the two-year cycle. 
 
The preceding theory suggests at least three complimentary hypotheses. The first set of 
questions involve whether or not the accounting profession is engaged in pay-for-
performance contracting. The economic theory of regulation suggests that accountants 
will give rationally to powerful legislative members who can influence policy outcomes, 
including leaders and members on committee having jurisdiction over issues relevant to 




given to influence specific legislation, either as payment for reciprocal voting behavior or 
as fees paid to gain access for lobbying activities. The second hypothesis suggested by 
the political economy literature is that accountants are a low access demand group with 
high ideological concerns who use PAC contributions to change the composition of the 
legislature rather than to influence specific policies.  The relatively low lobbying demand 
ratio exhibited by accountants suggests that as a group, the accounting profession may 
use PAC money more as an electoral strategy rather than to gain access to incumbent 
legislators.  Assuming that accountants do target specific legislators or electoral 
candidates, a related question concerns the effectiveness of PAC contributions in 
influencing their votes. Therefore, the third hypothesis is that members of the committees 
having jurisdiction over SOX who received PAC contributions from accountants 
reciprocated by casting roll call votes in favor of the profession on SOX related motions 
and amendments. I consider these hypotheses complimentary since they are not mutually 
exclusive. That is, accountants may use PAC contributions in pay-for-performance 
contracting, to gain access to powerful incumbent legislators and/or to support specific 




The first stage of the analysis examines whether the accounting profession rationally 




committees members or to candidates in close electoral races. Specifically, I test for PAC 
contributions to members of the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development because these committees had 
direct jurisdictional authority over the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This stage of the analysis 
also determines whether the accounting profession allocated relatively more monetary 
resources to candidates in close electoral races.  The held assumption is that PAC 
contributions paid by the accounting profession favor candidates with more pro-business 
ideologies.  Stated more formally, these hypotheses assert: 
 
H1a: The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to members of the 
Congressional committees having jurisdiction over SOX than to other members of 
Congress. 
H1b: The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to Congressional 
members  with pro-business voting records. 
H1c: The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to Congressional 
members in close electoral races.  
 
The second stage of the analysis attempts to determine whether PAC contributions have 
any significant effect on the voting behavior of committee members having direct 
jurisdiction over SOX with respect to specific provisions of SOX relevant to the 
economic interests of the profession. This is a more direct test of the pay-for-performance 





H2: There will be a positive relationship between PAC contributions paid by the 
accounting profession to Congress and roll call voting favorable to the interests of the 
profession.  
 
I do not expect any relationship to exist on the final vote on SOX, given that it was 
unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the House.  However, there were some 
important motions and amendments proposed during its consideration that would have 
had a material economic impact on the profession, and the roll call votes on these issues 




I collected the data on PAC contributions for Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche, 
Ernst and Young, KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the AICPA from the web site for 
the Center for Responsive Politics.  I collected all other data, including leadership 
positions, committee memberships, voting record and percentage of the vote received in 
the last election from the Congressional record and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  The 
House of Representatives began the 107th legislative cycle with 220 Republicans, 211 
Democrats, 2 Independents, 5 Delegates and 2 vacancies. 383 representatives were men, 
55 women, and 41 were newly elected.  The House sample contained 392 observations 




members were excluded from the analysis.  The descriptive statistics for the House 
sample in Table I-2 show that there are relatively few powerful legislators in leadership 
or committee assignments.   
 
Table I-2. Descriptive Statistics for the U.S. House of Representatives Sample 












1 8 18,197* 17,008 Member of Top 
Leadership (LEADER) 
1 if the legislator holds a top leadership 
position, 0 otherwise. 
0 384 4,963* 7,559 
1 41 8,116** 7,169 Member of Energy and 
Commerce Committee 
or Ways and Means 
Committee (RELATED) 
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a 
committee membership in a committee 
that has jurisdiction over tax legislation 
or other legislation related to the 
accounting profession, 0 otherwise. 
0 351 4,896** 8,079 
1 60 11,207*** 10,475 Member of House 
Financial Services 
Committee (FINANCE) 
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a 
committee membership in a committee 
that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0 
otherwise. 
0 332 4,153*** 7,013 
1 199 7,040*** 8,972 Member of the 
Republican party 
(PARTY) 
1 if Republican, 0 otherwise. 
0 193 3,479*** 6,585 
Continuous variables Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. 
Ideology  
(USCC106) 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce voting record for the 
106th Congressional cycle. Higher ratings are 
pro-business (0-100). 
392 0.61 0.28 
Electoral Competition 
(ELECT) 
One minus the percentage of the vote received in 
the previous election. 
392 0.30 0.13 
Correlation matrix 
 PAC LEADER RELATED FINANCE USCC106 ELECT 
PAC -      
LEADER† .233*** -     
RELATED† .123** -.027 -    
FINANCE† .316*** -.032 -.145*** -   
USCC106 .321*** .194 .035 .006 -  
ELECT .197*** .031 -.041 .050 .238*** - 
PARTY .225*** .211 .065 .023 .885*** .168*** 
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-Tailed) 
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-Tailed) 






Regarding the prevailing congressional ideology, the average USCC ratings for all 
legislators in the sample is relatively pro-business, indicating they vote in favor of the US 
Chamber of Commerce agenda 61% of the time.  T-tests of differences in mean PAC 
contributions paid by the accounting profession were significant in the expected direction 
for all variables of interest.  The accounting profession paid three times as much to the 
top leadership of the House of Representatives.  These included Party Leaders, Party 
Whips, Chairs of the Financial Services or related committees and the House Speaker. 
The profession also paid more money on average to members of the Financial Services or 
related committees and to Republican party members.  The measure of electoral 
competition shows that House members captured an average 70% of the vote in the 
previous election. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis of whether the accounting profession allocated relatively 
more money to members of important committees having jurisdiction over SOX, I follow 
Roberts and Bobek (2004) and Roberts, et al (2003) by using a tobit model of PAC 
contributions paid by the accounting profession against committee membership 
controlling for political ideology, leadership and industry-related committee membership. 
I also borrow from Ansolabehere, et al (2002) by adding a variable to measure electoral 
competition.  A tobit model is used because the distribution of PAC contributions is 
censored below zero and significantly skewed to the right (Roberts and Bobek, 2004; 
Roberts, et al, 2003; Chappell, 1982). These data characteristics cause regular OLS 






PAC = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2LEADER + b3RELATED + b4FINANCE + b5ELECT 
Where: 
 
PAC = Legislators total receipt of PAC contributions from the accounting 
profession. 
USCC106 = Legislators cumulative voting record rated by the U.S, Chamber of 
Commerce voting record for the 106th Congress.  Higher ratings are pro-
business (0-100). 
LEADER = 1 if the legislator holds a top leadership position, 0 otherwise. 
RELATED = 1 if the legislator is a member of holds a committee membership in a 
committee that has jurisdiction over tax legislation or other legislation 
related to the accounting profession, 0 otherwise. 
FINANCE = 1 if the legislator is a member of holds a committee membership in a 
committee that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0 otherwise. 
ELECT =  One minus the percentage of the vote received in the previous election. I 
record unopposed elections at 0%. 
 
Interpreting the coefficients of the tobit model can be difficult.  According to McDonald 
and Moffitt (1980), the direction and statistical significance of the tobit coefficients can 
be interpreted the same as regular regression, but the marginal effects of the independent 
variables must be scaled for the probability that the latent variable will actually be 




described as the desire or the propensity of the accounting profession to contribute to a 
given legislator.  The profession makes no payment until this desire reaches a certain 
threshold at which point the payment becomes observable.  The probability of observing 
a payment changes as the levels of the independent variables change.  Tobit models were 
tested using the statistical software package LIMDEP, which is designed especially for 
tests that contain a limited dependent variable. LIMDEP calculates the conditional mean 
of the model at a sample point where all the independent variables are at their mean and 
then scales the coefficients by the probability that a payment will be made.  The results of 
the model for the House of Representatives sample are in table I-3. 
 
Table I-3. Tobit model of PAC Contributions for U.S. House of Representatives 























CONSTANT +/- -12.94 1.81 -7.45 (.000) -7.56*  
USCC106 + 14.28 2.02 7.07 (.000) 8.34* 0.61 
LEADER + 13.96 3.40 4.11 (.000) 8.16* 0.02 
RELATED + 7.03 1.63 4.31 (.000) 4.11* 0.10 
FINANCE + 10.77 1.38 7.80 (.000) 6.29* 0.15 
ELECT + 11.53 4.30 2.68 (.008) 6.74* 0.30 
Sigma =9.33 (σ=.44, SE=20.92, p-value= .0000) 
Log Likelihood function -971.68 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 4.80 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.58 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables  
(One-tailed p-values can be used for directional predictions.) 
* Marginal effects significant at .01 
 
All variables of interest were significant in the expected direction in support of 
hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c.  The most important predictor of PAC contributions made to 




ideology followed by electoral competition and committee membership.  The marginal 
effects for political ideology and top leadership position were twice that of membership 
on related committees and a third more for election tightness and membership on the 
Financial Services Committee. The statistically significant and positive coefficients for 
the FINANCE and RELATED variables indicates that the accounting profession 
allocated relatively higher levels of financial resources to members of the House 
Financial Services Committee having jurisdiction over SOX and to other House 
committees relevant to the economic well being of the profession. This result suggests 
that the profession is concerned with gaining access to these committee members, 
ostensibly to lobby them on behalf of its membership and/or their clients.  The 
statistically significant and positive coefficient for the ELECT variable indicates the 
accounting profession also allocated relatively more PAC money to candidates in close 
elections. This result suggests that the accounting profession is concerned with 
controlling the composition of the legislature. Further analysis was conducted on the 
interaction between electoral tightness and political ideology to test whether the 
profession was biased in giving more to pro-business candidates in close elections, but 
the results were inconclusive. I used two models to test the interaction between political 
ideology and election tightness. In the first model, USCC106 and ELECT alone were 
regressed against PAC contributions using ordinary least squares.  The coefficients for 
both variables were significant (α = .01) in the expected direction.  In the second model, 
an interactive variable [USCC106*(1-ELECT107)] was added to test for the interaction 
between election tightness and ideology.  The results of the second model indicated that 




interactive variable was significant.  This result suggests that the profession is interested 
in controlling the ideological composition of the legislature by giving more contributions 
to pro-business candidates who likely face close elections.  When the interaction was 
tested using the censored model, the results indicated that political ideology was the only 
significant predictor even after the interactive variable for election tightness was 
introduced.  Consequently, the proposition that political ideology moderates contributions 
to candidates in close elections remains unresolved and left to future research. 
 
Extending the analysis to the Senate, I add an indicator variable (ELECTYR) to the 
model as suggested by Roberts and Bobek (2004) to control for election year variation. 
Unlike the House of Representative, where all incumbents are up for re-election every 
two years, Senators serve 6 year staggered terms and their receipts from PACs tend to 
increase during election years.  I also add an interactive variable to control for the 
potential interaction between election year increases and membership on other 
committees relevant to the profession (ELECTYR*RELATED).  
 
The final Senate sample contained 88 observations since 12 members were newly elected 
and were not rated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The descriptive statistics shown 
in table I-4 support the hypothesis that senators facing re-election receive substantially 





Table I-4. Descriptive Statistics U.S. Senate Sample 
Descriptive Statistics 
Indicator variables Variable Description Group N Mean 
PAC 
Std. Dev. 
1 4 10,395 17,616 Member of Leadership 
Team (LEADER) 
1 if the legislator holds a leadership 
position, 0 otherwise. 
0 84 6,332 10,040 
1 20 5,669 10,874 Member of Senate 
Finance Committee or 
Joint Committee on 
Taxation (RELATED) 
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a 
committee membership in a committee 
that has jurisdiction over tax legislation 
or other legislation related to the 
accounting profession, 0 otherwise. 
0 68 6,766 10,290 
1 16 9,856 13,381 Member of Senate 
Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban 
Affairs (BANK) 
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a 
committee membership in a committee 
that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0 
otherwise. 0 72 5,775 9,536 
1 33 15,878*** 11,917 Election Year 
(ELECTYR) 
 
1 if it is an election year, 0 otherwise 
0 55 900*** 1,869 
1 47 8,312* 11,284 Member of the 
Republican party 
(PARTY) 
1 if Republican, o otherwise 
0 41 4,459* 8,914 
Continuous variables Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. 
Ideology  
(USCC106) 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce voting record for the 
106th Congressional cycle. Higher ratings are 
pro-business (0-100). (Twelve members were 
unrated) 
88 .63 .26 
Electoral Competition 
(ELECT) 
One minus the percentage of the vote received in 
the previous election. 
88 .40 .08 
Correlation matrix 





PAC        
LEADER† -.082       
RELATED† -.045 .142      
BANK† .153 .039 -.185     
USCC106 .250** -.053 .026 .037    
ELECTYR† .703*** -.056 -.084 -.000 .167   
ELECT -.319*** -.082 .285*** -.077 .000 .384***  
PARTY .186 -.015 -.037 -.027 .901*** .112 -.034 
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed) 
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed) 
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed) 





During the 107th congressional election cycle, senators facing re-election received almost 
$15,000 more in PAC contributions from the profession than those not facing re-election.   
The data also indicate that Republicans received about twice as much from the profession 
than non-republicans.  Independent sample T tests did not find any statistical difference 
in PAC contributions paid by the profession based on committee membership or 
leadership position.  Mean ratings on political ideology remain comparable to the House 
data, while electoral competition in the Senate appears stronger.  As expected, the 
correlation matrix indicates a significant positive association between PAC contributions 
and pro-business voting record, election tightness and election year.   
 
Table I-5 shows the results of the tobit model testing the rationality of PAC contributions 
paid by the profession to the Senate.  The censored model indicates significant parameter 
coefficients in the expected direction for the variables related to pro-business ideology, 
membership on the Senate Banking committee, election year and election tightness. The 
coefficient for Top leadership position is marginally significant given the .104 P-value 
can reduce by half. The variable related to membership on related committees was not 
significant, nor was its interaction with election year.  Similar results were obtained using 
alternative models that either substituted an interactive variable for election tightness and 





Table I-5. Tobit model of PAC Contributions to the U.S. Senate 






















Mean of X 
CONSTANT +/- -28.92 9.09 -3.18 (.002) -15.14***  
USCC106 + 11.35 5.32 2.13 (.033) 5.93** .630 
LEADER + 9.63 5.93 1.63 (.104) 5.04 .045 
RELATED + 0.01 4.82 0.00 (.998) 0.00 .227 
BANK + 6.79 3.19 2.13 (.034) 3.55** .182 
ELECTYR + 19.81 3.11 6.36 (.000) 10.36*** .375 
ELECT + 33.07 19.29 1.71 (.087) 17.31* .395 
RELATED*ELECTYR + 2.91 6.79 0.43 (.668) 1.52 .068 
Sigma =10.13 (σ=.1.12, SE=9.02, p-value= .0000) 
Log Likelihood function -184.06 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 
(One-tailed p-values can be used for directional predictions.) 
Marginal effects significant (two tailed) ***=.01, **=.05, *=.10 
 
These results provide further support for hypotheses H1a, b and c in that the profession 
appears to have a significant bias in their contributions toward congressional members 
with pro-business ideologies and those sitting on important committees having 
jurisdiction over matters relevant to the economic interests of the profession.  The 
profession also allocated relatively more resources to incumbent Senators who faced stiff 
competition in the previous election cycle and were facing an imminent election in the 
current election cycle.  These results also support the hypotheses that the accounting 
profession is equally concerned with gaining access to members on the powerful Senate 
Banking committee and with controlling the composition of the Senate. Regarding the 
relative magnitude of the marginal effects, the results indicate that elections are the most 
important influence in determining PAC contributions paid by the profession to Senators.  
Political ideology and having a top leadership position are also important, followed by 





Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between PAC contributions paid by the 
accounting profession to congress and roll call voting favorable to the interests of the 
profession.  In order to test this hypothesis, I specify a probit model that takes into 
account the dichotomous nature of roll call votes.  The focus is on a transformation of the 
probability that the dependent variable equals one.  In practical terms, the probit model 
should come to the same conclusions as a binary logistic regression model, however, 
probit coefficients tend to be smaller and are interpreted differently (Borooah, 2002).  
One of the main differences is that probit coefficients represent the marginal effect of a 
unit change on the cumulative normal probability (Z-score) of the dependent rather than 
the natural log of the odds ratio. Probit also uses an inverse standard normal cumulative 
distribution function while logistic regression uses a binomial distribution function.    
Chappell (1982) suggests that if campaign contributions are actually endogenous to 
voting behavior, as may be the case, the single equation estimation technique is subject to 
possible simultaneous equations bias. In such cases, there will be a correlation between 
the error terms of the censored PAC contribution model and the probit models and the 
coefficients will be biased upwards possibly indicating significance where this is none. If 
this is the case, he recommends a simultaneous “probit-tobit” model that uses predicted 
values of an interest group’s propensity to contribute from the tobit model to estimate the 
probit model of the probability that a legislator will cast a vote in favor of the interest 
group.  However, Chappell (1982) states that if there is no correlation between the error 
terms, the single equation techniques are sufficient to estimate the models.  The error 




form of the single equation probit model is: 
 
VOTE = b0 + b1USCC1061i + b2PAC1i 
 
Where VOTE is coded 1 for votes favorable for the profession and 0 for votes 
unfavorable to the profession.  The independent variables for political ideology and PAC 
contributions received remain as described in model 2.  A statistically significant positive 
coefficient for the variable of interest (PAC) would support the hypothesis that PAC 
contributions paid by the accounting industry are associated with roll call voting behavior 





A summary of the votes taken in the House of Representatives on H.R. 3763 as originally 
drafted appears in table I-6.  
 
 
Table I-6. Major Legislative Actions H.R. 3763 
House consideration April 24, 2002 
No. Sponsor Issue Pro-CPA Result Tally 
1 Oxley R-OH Amendment to strike provisions 
requiring senior financial officers 
code of ethics 
Neutral Agreed Voice vote 
2 Capuano D-MA Amendment to require 1 person on 
Public Regulatory Organization to be 
a non-CPA 
Unfavorable Rejected Voice vote 
3 Sherman D-CA Amendment to require net capital of 
CPA to equal ½ of audit revenue 
Unfavorable Rejected Voice Vote 
4 Kucinich D-OH Amendment to create Federal Bureau 





5 LaFalce D-NY Amendment to establish Public 
Regulatory Organization within 90 















8 Sarbanes-Oxley Motion to pass    
 
At least three of the roll call votes concerning H.R. 3763 were of particular interest to the 
accounting profession. The first vote concerned an amendment, sponsored by Mr. 
Kucinich, D-OH, that would have created a Federal Bureau of Audits to audit publicly 
traded companies.  The economic effect of this amendment would have significantly 
reduced audit fee income among the major accounting firms making its passage clearly 
unfavorable to the accounting profession as a whole.  The second roll call vote concerned 
an amendment sponsored by Mr. LaFalce D-NY that would have required the creation of 




Public Regulatory Organization would diminish the autonomy of the accounting 
profession in standard setting and thus passage of this amendment would have been 
unfavorable to the accounting profession as a whole.  The third important roll call vote 
concerned the motion to pass H.R. 3763 as written.   This would have allowed the SEC to 
establish the criteria for a Public Regulatory Organization (PRO) comprised of both 
public members and professionals to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures. The bill also prohibited auditors from performing an unspecified list of 
consulting activities, to be determined at an unspecified future date.  There was also a 
provision that authorized the SEC to perform the duties of the PRO if it had failed to 
recognize any other PRO within one year of enactment. Thus, without any specific 
restrictions or mechanisms to ensure implementation, H.R. 3763 effectively maintained 
the status quo while providing a rhetorical display that condemned improper behavior.  
Since the effect was purely symbolic, I consider its passage as favorable to the 
accounting profession as a whole. I have omitted tables of descriptive statistics for each 
of the roll call votes taken in the House because they were almost identical to those 
shown in table I-1 for the PAC contribution models. The results of the analysis for each 
House vote are shown in tables I-7, I-8 and I-9.  
 
Overall, the model indicates that political ideology was the best predictor of pro-business 
roll call voting behavior by members of the House of Representatives.  The coefficients 
for political ideology (USCC106) are positive and significant in all three votes. This 
means that a past record of pro-business voting was the best predictor of voting in 




PAC contributions on roll call voting behavior, results for two of the roll call votes show 
positive and significant (α=.10) coefficients. These were the votes on Rep. Oxley’s 
motion to pass H.R. 3763 (HV110) as originally drafted and Rep. Kucinich’s amendment 
to create a Federal Bureau of Audits (HV107). However, the PAC contribution 
coefficient was not significant on HV108, the amendment introduced by Rep. LaFalce D-
NY that would have required the creation of the Public Regulatory Organization within 
90 days of enactment.  This result could be due to party loyalty since the vote on HV108 
broke much more along party lines than did HV110 and HV107. In all models, the 
significant partial derivatives of the expected value of the vote for PAC contributions 
were smaller than those for political ideology.  
 
Since the probability of a favorable vote is not a linear function, but a cumulative normal 
function of Z, the effect of a unit change in PAC contributions on the probability of a 
favorable vote depends on the level of the all the independent variables. Therefore, in 
order to interpret the coefficients you can substitute the sample means of the 
independents into the probit equation and calculate an estimated Z score for each vote.  
The Z score corresponds to the overall probability of a favorable vote found in a standard 
normal distribution Z table. This provides the baseline probability of a favorable vote 
when all variables are at their sample means. Adding one unit to the mean of the variable 
of interest and calculating the change in the overall Z score provides an estimate of the 
marginal effect of a unit change in that variable.  LIMDEP calculates the marginal effects 
for the independents at the means of the independents.  These results are shown in the 




equation for HV110 yields an estimated Z score of approximately 2.83 or a cumulative 
probability of over 99%.  I interpret this as the probability that a legislator with a USCC 
rating of .61 and who had already received $5,200 from the profession would vote in 
favor of SOX as originally drafted in the House. The partial derivative for PAC 
contributions on HV110 shows that the marginal effect of a one thousand dollar 
contribution on the probability of the vote, holding all other variables constant at their 
mean, changes the Z score .00073.  This indicates less than a .01 percent change in the 
probability of the legislator voting for the bill.  A quick review of the voting data 
indicates that eighty-five members of the House met this criteria and all of them (100%) 
voted in favor of the bill. Moreover, this percentage did not change by selecting members 
receiving $1,000 more or less than $5,200.  In fact, only one legislator out of 198 with a 
USCC rating equal to or greater than .61 voted against H.R. 3763 as originally drafted.  
 
The results for HV107, the only other vote with a statistically significant PAC 
coefficient, indicate an even smaller marginal effect.  I noted statistically significant 
marginal effects when testing the responses of non-republicans only.  The elasticity for 
measures for political ideology and PAC contributions were 1.56 and 0.12 respectively 
indicating a slightly larger effect of PAC contributions on non-republican voting behavior 





Table I-7. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV110 
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 110 















CONSTANT +/- -3.00 0.41 -7.28 (.000) -0.23E-1 - 
USCC106 + 8.69 1.23 7.07 (.002) 0.66E-1 0.61 
PAC1000 + 0.10 0.31 3.11 (.001) 0.73E-3 5.28 
Republican 213 Aye, 2 Nay 
Non-Republican 121 Aye, 88 Nay  
Chi Square: 247.65 
Log Likelihood function -200.71 
Marginal effects not significant. 
 
Table I-8. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV107 
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 107 















CONSTANT +/- -1.52 0.47 -3.23 (.001) -0.51E-03  
USCC106 + 7.17 1.67 4.31 (.000) 0.24E-02 0.61 
PAC1000 + 0.17 0.10 1.70 (.089) 0.58E-04 5.20 
Republican 0 Aye, 213 Nay 
Non-Republican 39 Aye, 168 Nay 
Chi Square:108.19 
Log Likelihood function  -120.49 
Marginal effects not significant 
 
Table I-9. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV108 
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 108 















CONSTANT +/- -6.60 0.76 -8.74 (.000) -2.39*  
USCC106 + 10.29 1.10 9.32 (.000) 3.73* 0.61 
PAC1000 + -0.26E-01 0.02 -1.61 (.109) -0.97E-02 5.27 
Republican 1 Aye, 214 Nay 
Non-republican 201 Aye, 5 Nay 
Chi Square: 421.90 
Log Likelihood function -258.54 





In extending the analysis to the Senate, I did not find any significant effect of PAC 
contributions on roll call voting behavior related to issues of relevance to the profession.  
Of the nine roll call votes, seven were unanimous and only one split roll call vote was 
relevant to the accounting profession.  Table I-10 shows the significant actions and roll 




Table I-10. Major Legislative Actions S.2673 
Senate Consideration July 8-15, 2002 
No. Sponsor Issue Pro-CPA Result Tally 
4174 
I,II,III 
Leahy D-VT Criminal sanctions for destruction 
of evidence or defraud investors 
Unfavorable Withdrawn  
4175 McConnell R-
KY 
Amend 4174 require audits of 
labor organizations 
Favorable Tabled  
4176 Miller D-GA Require CEO sign Corp. tax 
returns 
Neutral Withdrawn UA 




4184 Gramm R-TX Amend 4174-I Allow waivers for 
NAS restrictions for small 
businesses 
Favorable Fell  
4185 Leahy D-VT Criminal sanctions for destruction 





















Amend 4187 modify attorney 
practices toward clients 
Neutral Tabled  
4206 Miller D-GA CEO  sign Corp. Tax returns Favorable Agreed UA 




4261 Shelby R-AL SEC Study on aider and abettor 
law 
Neutral Agreed UA 
4269 Levin D-MI Amend 4187 Banning certain 
individuals from public companies 
Unfavorable Fell   
4270 McCain R-AZ Motion to recommit with 
amendment 4270 – expense stock 
options 
Neutral Ruled out 
of order 
 






4272 Levin D-MI Amend 4271 Banning certain 









4286 Carnahan Modify Amendment No. 4187, to 
require disclosure of transactions 






4295 Schumer D-NY Prohibit personal loans by issuers 
to officers 
Neutral Agreed UA 
4296 Schumer D-NY Study Acct for SPE’s Neutral Agreed UA 









I applied the probit model to Senate roll call vote SV169 that concerned tabling an 
amendment introduced by Mitch McConnell (R-KY) to require audits of labor 
organizations. Such an amendment would have been favorable to the economic interests 
of the profession and tabling the amendment effectively removed it from consideration.  
The results of the probit model on SV168 in table I-11 are similar to the results on 
HV108, indicating that political ideology dominated the outcome.  The USCC106 
variable was positive and significant in the expected direction while the PAC variable 
was not significant. 
 
Table I-11. Probit Roll Call Voting Model SV168 
U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote 168 















CONSTANT +/- -5.30 1.09 -4.84 (.000) -1.92*  
USCC106 + 7.83 1.50 5.22 (.000) 2.83* .63 
PAC1000 + -.77E-01 0.22E-01 -0.35 (.730) -0.28E-02 6.65 
Republican 4 Aye 43 Nay 
Non-republican  51 Aye 0 Nay 
Chi Square: 84.08 
Log Likelihood function -59.52 
* Marginal effects significant at .01 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis supports the hypothesis that interested money is flowing disproportionately 
from the accounting profession to pro-business legislators and members of powerful 




The first model tested the rationality of the profession’s PAC contributions to members 
of Congress.  The results indicate that accountants give relatively more money to 
representatives with pro-business voting records and to incumbents elected by tight 
margins. This finding suggests that accountants may be attempting to influence the 
ideological composition of the legislature by assisting favored candidates.  However, the 
analysis on whether the profession is trying to stack the legislature with pro-business 
legislators was inconclusive.  An OLS model testing the interaction between election 
tightness and pro-business voting behavior was significant, but the interaction was not 
significant in the censored model.  The data also show that controlling for political 
ideology, accountants gave significantly more money to incumbent legislators who were 
members on the committees having jurisdiction over SOX. This pattern is consistent with 
the access hypothesis that predicts special interest groups will target powerful 
congressional members, regardless of their political ideology, simply because they are in 
a position to influence policy outcomes.  
 
The second model tested the effect of PAC contributions on specific roll call votes that 
had a material impact on the accounting profession. The results indicate that the marginal 
effect of PAC contributions on specific roll call votes is very small, if it is present at all.  
Past pro-business voting behavior is the best predictor of roll call votes relevant to the 
profession. Even where PAC contributions have a statistically significant association with 
a roll call vote, they do not seem to have any practical significance.  
 




accounting profession is not neutral with respect to policy formulation.  The pro-business 
bias in PAC contributions suggests that the profession may represent the interests of its 
wealthy corporate sponsors over the interests of the broader public. To the extent that 
incumbents vote in a manner consistent with the interests of their sponsors, this money 
may affect policy outcomes.   
 
A second implication is that to the extent that the profession is successful in influencing 
election outcomes, this pro-business bias may skew political representation in the 
legislature, marginalizing less wealthy interests and undermining the ideal of 
representative democracy. Marginalizing less financially munificent interest groups such 
as those concerned with Civil Rights, women’s issues and the environment from the 
political process may contribute to a growing disillusionment with the democratic system 
among the broader public that in turn, may lead to less participation by the public in the 
political process.   
 
The third implication is that the bias in contributions to powerful legislators having direct 
authority over important legislation relevant to the economic interests of the profession 
suggests that the profession is engaged in a strategy to capture the important regulatory 
institutions governing its actions.   While theories of economic regulation suggest that the 
political system will ultimately achieve equilibrium among competing interest groups, 
there is little or no discussion on the effects of short-run disequilibrium or the disutility 





There are also several important limitations of this study.   First, the study concentrated 
on a single issue and legislative cycle.   Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to 
other time-periods or issues.  There was a great deal of public interest in accounting 
reform and investor protection following the collapse of Enron and other notable public 
companies. There was also a significant amount of public interest in campaign financing 
during the 107th Congress.  On March 27, 2002, the president signed the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act into law. This act banned soft money contributions to political 
parties and doubled the previous limits on the amount of hard money that individuals can 
contribute.  It is unknown whether the enhanced public salience on these issues may have 
affected the pattern of PAC contributions during the study period.  In addition, much of 
the political process is unobservable and hence, excluded from the analysis.  The impact 
of logrolling, emulation of leaders, private deals and in-kind payments on voting behavior 
is unknown, but may be significant.  We are also unable to determine the precise timing 
of PAC contributions and see whether the profession paid money ex-ante or ex-post with 
respect to any specific vote.  Ex-ante payments could influence a vote if legislators 
interpreted the payments as such and were willing to reciprocate by voting in a direction 
that they otherwise would not have.  However, ex-ante payments might also galvanize a 
legislator’s position against the profession if they see it as a nefarious attempt to 
influence their vote.  Likewise, ex-post payments could influence a vote if the payments 
represent compensation to the legislator for having voted a certain way and the legislator 
changed their vote to obtain the compensation. However, if the legislators do not believe 
the profession will compensate them regardless of their vote, then any ex-post payment 





Further analysis is also required to determine if accountants as a group wield an 
inordinate amount of political influence relative to other groups, such as labor or specific 
industries, such as oil and gas or pharmaceuticals.  While the base proposition that PAC 
money paid by the accounting profession is biased toward pro-business legislators was 
supported in this study, the interests of the profession may at times, conflict with those of 
their clients.  For example, legislation that increases the compliance burden on industry 
favors the economic welfare of the profession, but not their clients.  Future research 
should also seek answers to the larger question of the profession’s relative political 
influence by analyzing the extent of its lobbying activities and the relative influence of 
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II) STUDY TWO – A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF TESTIMONY 




Several recent studies, including part one of this dissertation, have focused on identifying 
and assessing the effectiveness of political strategies used by the accounting profession to 
influence Federal legislation (Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 
2003).  Using Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of political strategies, Roberts, et al 
(2003) concluded that accounting firms and professional organizations have generally 
adopted a long-term relational approach for influencing the political process that spans 
multiple issues and incorporates a variety of strategies and tactics. They found that 
accounting firms have participated both individually and collectively through 
professional organizations making extensive use of informational and financial incentive 
tactics as well as a modest use of constituency building tactics.  Roberts, et al (2003) 
further tested for the effectiveness of these strategies on roll call voting, and found a 
significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC) contributions 
by the accounting profession to committee members and roll call voting behavior 
favorable to the interests of the profession.  Finally, Roberts et al. (2003) suggested that 




Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as proposed by Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH) in the 
House. 
 
Part one of this dissertation found that the accounting profession rationally allocated 
relatively more PAC contributions to members of committees having direct jurisdiction 
over SOX.  This finding suggests that these PAC contributions were given in order to 
gain access to legislators and lobby them on behalf of the accounting profession. This 
reasoning is consistent with economic theories of regulation that predict regulated 
industries will attempt to influence or even capture the institutions regulating them for the 
economic benefit of their members (Stigler, 1971).  
 
Study one also found that the profession rationally allocated more financial resources to 
legislators with pro-business voting records and to legislators engaged in close elections, 
suggesting that the accounting profession is trying to influence the ideological 
composition of Congress by supporting legislators with pro-business voting records.  The 
study also tested a roll call voting model on congressional roll call votes related to SOX 
and found a significant association between PAC contributions paid by the profession and 
roll call voting behavior favorable to the interests of the profession on two out of three 
roll call votes in the House of Representatives. However, the marginal effect of the PAC 
contributions on voting behavior was small, particularly among legislators with a record 
of pro-business voting.  These findings indicate that PAC contributions are something 
more than symbolic relationship sustaining gifts, but roll call voting models are 





The final roll call vote on SOX was unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the 
House and this invariance prohibits any empirical analysis using traditional linear voting 
models.  While the invariance in the final vote suggests that legislators across the 
political spectrum had achieved consensus on how to reform corporate governance and 
audit regulation, a cursory review of the congressional transcripts suggests that legislators 
were often in heated disagreement over specific provisions of SOX. The final vote may 
have merely represented a buckling of congressional will under enormous public scrutiny 
following the Enron and WorldCom collapses.  The loss in market value that investors 
suffered from these and other frauds during 2001-2002 was unprecedented and enraged 
large blocks of powerful constituents who demanded action.  As a result, legislators may 
have felt compelled to vote in favor of the final bill or risk losing their seat in the next 
election.   
 
In December 2001, following the collapse of Enron and with congressional elections less 
than a year away, Congress was well motivated to act swiftly and enacted SOX in near 
record speed.  Less than eight months transpired between the announcement of Enron’s 
bankruptcy and signing of the Act.  Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Chairman of Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs began the first of ten public hearings 
on accounting reform and investor protection on February 12, 2002.  Almost 
immediately, on February 14, 2002 Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH), Chairman of the House 
Financial Services Committee, sponsored H.R. 3763 “The Corporate and Auditing 




Services Committee began the first of three related hearings on March 13, 20024.   Sen. 
Sarbanes subsequently introduced S2673, the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002 on June 25, 2002 were merged during a conference 
committee on July 25, 2002 when the House passed HR3763 as amended by the Senate to 
incorporate S2673.  
 
This study seeks to expand the study of political influence of the accounting profession in 
federal regulation by incorporating a textual analysis of congressional testimony during 
the policy formulation period of SOX.  The focus of the study is on the political process 
as opposed to the outcome.  The underlying motivational theory is similar to that of roll 
call voting models.  I hypothesize a relationship between the level of PAC contributions 
donated by an interest group and behavior that is favorable to that interest group. In this 
paper, the focus is not on the final roll call vote of SOX, since that was virtually 
invariant.  Rather the focus is on the discourse during public hearings held by congress 
during the policy formulation period of SOX.  Fairclough (1989) asserts that politics is 
the language, including the disputes occurring in language and over language while 
Schaffner (1997) points out that language is fundamental to the process of transforming 
political will into social action.  Partington (2003) also claims there is a natural link 
between institutional analysis and textual analysis because the “discourse is the 
institution”.  This linkage between politics and discourse leads to the proposition that the 
linguistic patterns of committee members in public hearings related to SOX will vary 
systematically depending on a vector of independent variables including PAC 




were publicly talking about SOX, including how frequently and forcefully they were 
speaking, and whether there is any evidence that the accounting profession influenced 
their speech. To the extent that speech patterns during congressional testimony can be 
associated with specific topics, positions and political ideologies should provide insight 
into the reasoning of the legislators and those who support them.  
 
The results of the study indicate that while controlling for political and structural factors, 
the propensity of Republican House Financial Services Committee members to speak 
during public hearings related to SOX was positively and significantly associated with 
the level of PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession. The study also finds 
that PAC contributions were positively associated with the frequency of speech among 
House Republican committee members concerning specific topics relevant to the 
profession, such as consulting services and non-audit services. Finally, the study finds a 
positive association between PAC contributions and the frequency that Republican House 
committee members used markers of persuasive language. The implication is that PAC 
contributions provide evidence consistent with the notion of pay-for-performance 
contracts, with legislators providing arguments consistent with the preferences of the 
profession. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section two reviews 
previous textual research in accounting. Section three develops hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between PAC contributions and speech performance.  Section four describes 
the data and methods of analysis.  Section five test the hypotheses, and section six 







Jones and Shoemaker (1994) provide an overview of content analysis in accounting 
research, dichotomizing much of it into two general classes, thematic studies and 
syntactic studies. Thematic studies identify themes or content categories within a text and 
attempt to draw some conclusions, or inferences regarding the motivations or concerns of 
the communicators.  Syntactic studies generally focus on the counting of words or 
concrete references using some formula, such as the Flesch Index5, to assess the 
readability of a text, or Diction6 analysis to evaluate verbal tone.  Smith and Taffler 
(2000) describe these alternative approaches as form oriented (objective/syntactic) versus 
meaning oriented (subjective/thematic). Using discriminant analysis and a concordance 
program to construct word and theme variables7 from discretionary disclosures in 
Chairman’s statements, Smith and Taffler (2000) found an association between the 
frequency of occurrence of certain keywords in the texts and financial distress.  Sydserff 
and Weetman (2002) used computerized Diction scoring and developed a transitivity 
index, measured as the number of passive constructions8 in a text, in analyzing 
Chairman’s statements and manager’s reports of good performers versus poor 
performers.  Since discourse with frequent passive constructions is typically more 
abstract, technical and formal in style, it creates the appearance of distance between the 
speaker and the message. Sydserff and Weetman (2002) theorized that poor performers 
would use more passive constructions that good performers. Their results were mixed, 




a more objective, detached style of writing, indicative of management wanting to distance 
itself from the message.  Ober, Zhao, Davis and Alexander (1999) also used Diction 
software to analyze narratives among Fortune 500 companies and found a higher level of 
certainty in recorded oral public communications of Fortune 500 companies versus their 
written Management Discussion and Analysis section in 10-K reports.  However, no 
association between the level of certainty expressed and profitability was found.  In 
summary, there is little extant theory regarding the role of text in accounting and the 




Committees offer a rich environment within which to study the dynamics of the 
legislative process. Romano (1997) describes the role of congressional committees as the 
key formulators of legislation since there is virtually no chance that a measure can pass 
without the approval of a committee.  All bills are referred to a committee as soon as they 
are introduced, and if the governing committee tables a bill, it is unlikely to reach the 
floor for a vote.  More importantly for the purposes of this study, committees hold public 
hearings on proposed legislation, obtain prepared testimony from experts and interested 
parties and question witnesses with regard to the particulars of related events.  
Ostensibly, the purpose of these hearings is to assist committee members in gathering 




literature tends to discount this informational role of congressional hearings (Romano, 
1997). Committee members have many sources of information and they often use 
hearings for personal reasons, such as to publicize a partisan agenda or to galvanize 
public support on a favored measure (Romano, 1997).  To these ends, committee chairs 
may ‘stack’ the witness lists with people supportive of their favored positions (Leyden, 
1995). Oleszek (1989) also noted that committee members enter hearings not only with 
prepared questions, but also with expected answers garnered through extensive staff 
interviews and rehearsals with potential witnesses.  In a classic case study, Huitt (1954) 
found no evidence that hearings changed committee members’ positions.  Rather, he 
suggested that each group came into the hearings with a ready-made frame of reference 
and only used the facts that were compatible with their arguments while discounting or 
ignoring others, even when elaborately documented (Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000).  
This suggests that the SOX hearings were primarily motivated to galvanize support 
behind partisan agendas rather than to gather new relevant information. 
 
Previous research indicates that congressional representatives are purposive actors 
(Kathlene, 1994; Hall, 1987; Sinclair, 1999, 1983). Sinclair suggests that political parties 
delegate power and resources to leaders to overcome collective action problems and 
facilitate the passage of legislation that furthers the interests of the party.  To the extent 
that leaders are faithful agents of the party, they should respond to changes in their 
member’s expectations. This faithful adoption of the party’s agenda may help explain the 
intransigent positions observed among committee members during public hearings. Hall 




hearings was associated with the goals of committee members and their relative 
opportunities or constraints to participate. Significant goals of committee members that 
were identified included serving their districts, making good policy, making a personal 
mark and promoting the president’s agenda. Significant opportunities and constraints on 
speaking included leadership position, party affiliation and freshman status. Kathlene 
(1994) found that after controlling for political factors and structural features of 
committee hearings, that men become more verbally aggressive and controlling of the 
hearing as the proportion of women increases in a legislative body. Verbal aggression 
was measured by the number of words spoken, number of turns taken and interruptions 
made or received. Important political factors and structural features related to 
participation in committee hearings that Kathlene (1994) identified included position, 
personal interest in the topic and legislative expertise. Personal interest was measured by 
the frequency that members mentioned specific topics or bills. Legislative expertise was 
measured by the number of terms served in the legislature and position was measured by 
whether the speaker held the chair and controlled the agenda and turns at talk. 
 
Previous research has also documented a pro-business and Republican bias in the 
accounting professions giving to congress in general.  This suggests that the profession is 
attempting to control the political ideology of the legislature and contradicts the access 
hypothesis that predicts the profession should give to powerful members of relevant 
committees regardless of their political ideology in order to gain access and lobby them 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi, 2002).   According to this hypothesis, there should 




party.  If this were true, then the profession should have rationally allocated equal 
amounts of resources to the Chairmen of the committees having direct jurisdiction over 
SOX regardless of their political affiliation since they control the agenda, topics and the 
turns at talk. However, this was not the case for SOX.  The relatively pro-business 
republican, Rep. Oxley, who was the Chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee, received a total of $43,500, making him the largest recipient of PAC 
contributions from the accounting profession during the 107th Congress. On the other 
hand, the relatively pro-social Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) who was Chairman of the 
powerful Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs received nothing 
from the profession.   
 
An alternative to the access/ideology theories suggests that PAC contributions represent 
pay-for-performance contracts where recipients reciprocate by casting votes or altering 
other behavior to further the agenda of the contributor. If this were true, it would be 
rational for the profession to give relatively more to the Republican or pro-business 
committee members who support the profession’s agenda since their behavior could 
influence the outcome of the policy formulation process.  According to this reasoning, 
Republican committee members receiving PAC contributions from the accounting 
profession should reciprocate by advancing the profession’s interests during public 
debate, and be more inclined to act in the professions interests.  However, it is also 
possible the profession would be motivated to pay members of the opposition in order to 
encourage them to remain silent or soften their arguments against the profession’s agenda 




committee member feels constrained by party affiliation from arguing forcefully in favor 
of a pro-business legislative alternative, the next best option would be to tone down the 
force of their party’s arguments or to remain silent on the matter.  This line of reasoning 
leads to the proposition that PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession should 
be positively associated with Republican speech during committee hearings regarding 
SOX and negatively associated with Non-republican speech, or more formally: 
 
H1a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively associated with speech 
performance among Republican committee members during committee hearings related 
to SOX. 
H1b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively associated with speech 
performance among Non-republican committee members during committee hearings 
related to SOX.  
 
In addition, not all topics under discussion during the SOX committee hearings were 
equally relevant to the accounting profession.  SOX had significant provisions affecting 
the issuers, boards of directors, corporate officers and audit committees. With respect to 
the provisions affecting audit firms, the text of the hearings indicates that the profession 
was particularly concerned with the potential prohibition against providing consulting 
services to a firm’s audit clients.  Partners of the major firms and former regulators 
provided extensive and compelling arguments on why these services do not compromise 
auditor independence.  However, legislators ultimately included a bright-line list of 




Another issue was the mandatory rotation of audit firms among publicly traded 
companies.  Again, a significant amount of controversy surrounded this topic, and the 
final bill ultimately included a compromise wherein audit partners in the same firm are 
required to rotate primary engagement responsibility every five years. Other issues of 
concern to the profession included, but were not limited to auditor independence, audit 
fees, and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that 
effectively stripped the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants of its ability to 
set auditing standards for publicly held entities. These items were contentious issues 
among legislators during the policy formulation period of SOX and the subject of much 
debate during the House and Senate committee hearings. To the extent that PAC 
contributions encouraged Republican committee members to argue in favor of the 
interests of the profession, there should be a positive association between PAC 
contributions and the frequency Republicans discussed these topics.  Alternatively, to the 
extent that PAC contributions encourage members of the opposition to remain silent or 
soften their arguments against the profession, there should be a negative association 
between contributions and speech. Hence the second set of hypotheses are: 
 
H2a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively related to the frequency 
of speech on topics relevant to the profession among Republicans committee members. 
H2b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively related to the 






Finally, it would be rational for the profession to give more to committee members who 
are relatively more persuasive.  This leads to a hypothesis that PAC contributions will be 
positively associated with the persuasiveness of political discourse. Again, the direction 
of the effect of PAC contributions should differ depending upon the issue and party 
affiliation.  Therefore, with respect to SOX, the third set of hypotheses are: 
 
H3a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively associated with 
linguistic markers of persuasion among Republican committee members. 
H3b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively associated with 
linguistic markers of persuasion among Non-republican committee members. 
 
The measurements for these markers are discussed in the data analysis section.  
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
The analysis is restricted to the prepared readouts and spontaneous speeches of members 
on the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Development during hearings related to formulating policy on SOX. 
The data consist of the transcripts of a series of congressional committee hearings related 
to SOX where people from a variety of affected interest groups, including the accounting 




accessible source of data concerning the most salient and relevant arguments given both 
in support of, and in opposition to key provision of SOX9.  The Government Printing 
Office identifies thirteen hearings specifically related to SOX and publishes them in four 
volumes under the title Accounting Reform and Investor Protection. These include the 
transcripts of ten hearings held by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs between February 12 and March 21, 2002 and three hearings of the House 
Committee on Financial Services.   
 
The participants consisted of committee members appointed from within the ranks of the 
governing parties and witnesses representing the most prestigious accounting, 
investment, and banking firms as well as past and present leaders of relevant regulatory 
agencies and standard setting bodies.  In general, the format of the hearings consists of 
opening (prepared) statements by each of the committee members and witnesses followed 
by a question and answer period. Occasionally, the participants submit written questions 
and responses following the hearing.  The text of the SOX hearings consist of about equal 
amounts of prepared statements of opinion and question and answer periods between two 
equally professional sides.  An important feature of this context however, is the position 
of the Chairman and his ability to regulate topics and turns at talk.  The majority party in 
the House and Senate appoint the Chairmen of their respective committees.  During the 
107th Congress, the Republicans had gained control of the House and appointed Rep. 
Oxley to chair the House Financial Services Committee (House committee).  The 
Democrats gained control of the Senate after Sen. James Jeffords (I-VT) left the 




MD) to chair the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Senate 
committee). 
 
The first of the Senate hearings began February 12, 2002 with the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee10 chaired by Sen. Sarbanes.  Rep. Oxley, chair of 
the House Financial Services Committee subsequently sponsored H.R. 3763 “The 
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002” 
on February 14, 2002 and held the first House hearings on March 13, 2002.    
 
Content analysis was conducted using the software, QSR N6 (QSR International, 2002) 
and Concordance 3.0 (Watt, 2002). QSR N6 enables the dissection of congressional 
hearings into coded nodes.  These nodes can be free (standalone) topics or embedded in 
tree banks.  QSR N6 also provides routines to search text among nodes and export 
frequency counts to SPSS for further analysis. A concordance program can search a text 
or set of texts for a string of letters (keyword or phrase) and list all occurrences along 
with a certain amount of co-text for each one.  These lists enable an analysis of the 
patterns in the co-text surrounding words providing information regarding their use. 
These lists can be sorted in a variety of ways such as alphabetically by headword, by 
frequency of occurrence, or according to co-occurring words (context) preceding it or 
following it. The concordances reported in this analysis were prepared using 







Descriptive statistics for the House and Senate samples are shown in tables II-1 and II-2.  
The House Financial Services Committee consisted of seventy members.  In general, the 
descriptive statistics indicate members of both the House and Senate committees were 
predominately pro-business11 incumbent males who had received PAC contributions 
from the profession.  As noted above, Republicans controlled the House committee and 
Democrats controlled the Senate committee.  Total turns at talk and text units spoken 
were considerably higher among the Senate committee members.  This is because there 
were ten days of Senate hearings and only three days of hearings in the House.  There are 
also fewer committee members in the Senate committee. A majority of the House 
committee members did not speak at all during the hearings while virtually all members 
of the Senate committee spoke.  In the House sample, the profession gave significantly 
more to previously incumbent and Republican committee members.  Independent T tests 
indicate that previously incumbent Senators also received more from the profession than 
freshmen, however Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate non-normal distributions for all 
variables in the Senate sample with the exception of Seniority and the nonparametric 





Table II-1. Descriptive Statistics House Financial Services Committee 
House Financial Services Committee 
Male 57 Received PAC 63 Freshman 10 
Female 13 No PAC  7 Re-elected 60 
Total 70 Total 70 Total 70 
      
Republican 38 USCC106> 50% 40 Speaker 30 
Democrat 31 USCC106<50% 20 Did not speak 40 
Independent 1 No USCC 10 Total 70 
Total 70 Total 70   
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
PAC money (thousands) 70 12.50 10.98 0 43.50 
Turns at talk 70 7.09 16.24 0 100.00 
Text units (sentences) 70 45.49 111.04 0 714.00 
Seniority 70 8.54 6.19 2 28.00 
PAC contributions 
Indicator variables Variable Description Group N Mean 
PAC 
Std. Dev. 
1 1 43.50 - Chairman position 
(CHAIR) 
1 if the legislator holds the 
committee chair, 0 otherwise. 0 69 12.10 10.39 
1 10 11.21*** 10.99 Freshman Status 
(FRESH) 
1 if the legislator is a freshman 
legislator, 0 otherwise. 0 60 20.61*** 10.47 
1 57 12.82 11.08 Gender (GENDER) 1 if the legislator is a Male, 0 
if female.  0 13 11.36 10.86 
1 38 16.05*** 10.44 Member of the 
Republican party 
(PARTY) 
1 if Republican, o otherwise 
0 32 8.40*** 10.28 
Correlation matrix 
 TURNS TEXT SENIOR CHAIR FRESH GENDE PARTY PAC 
TURNS -        
TEXTUNITS .963** -       
SENIORITY .411** .441** -      
CHAIR† .358** .456** .224 -     
FRESH† -.020 -.047 -.434** -.049 -    
GENDER† -.009 .033 .090 .057 -.015 -   
REPPART†Y -.064 -.084 .053 .110 .129 .152 -  
PAC1000 .153 .180 -.211 .342** .302* .052 .350** - 
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed) 
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed) 
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed) 






Table II-2. Descriptive Statistics Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban 
Affairs 
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs 
Male 20 Received PAC 14 Freshman 5 
Female 1 No PAC  7 Re-elected 16 
Total 21 Total 21 Total 21 
      
Republican 10 USCC106> 50% 9 Speaker 19 
Democrat 10 USCC106<50% 7 Did not speak 2 
Independent 1 No USCC 5 Total 21 
Total 21 Total 21   
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
PAC money (thousands) 21 8.2237 12.08 0 35.56 
Turns at talk 21 45.76 92.31 0 425 
Text units (sentences) 21 302.43 547.65 0 2,534 
Seniority 21 8 6.96 2 26 
PAC contributions 




1 1 0 - Chairman position 
(CHAIR) 
1 if the legislator holds the committee 
chair, 0 otherwise. 0 20 8.63 12.24 
1 5 3.00*‡ 3.67 Freshman Status 
(FRESH) 
1 if the legislator is a freshman 
legislator, 0 otherwise. 0 16 9.86*‡ 13.38 
1 20 8.18 12.39 Gender (GENDER) 1 if the legislator is a Male, 0 if female.  
0 1 9.00 - 
1 10 12.11 14.93 Member of the 
Republican party 
(PARTY) 
1 if Republican, o otherwise 
0 11 4.69 7.90 
Correlation matrix 
 TURNS TEXT SENIOR CHAIR FRESH GENDE PARTY PAC 
TURNS -        
TEXTUNITS .990** -       
SENIORITY .673**‡ .707**‡ -      
CHAIR† .941**‡ .934**‡ .593**‡ -     
FRESH† -.054 -.103 -.494* -.125 -    
GENDER† .052 .040 .198 .050 -.400 -   
REPPARTY† -.257 -.226 .000 -.213 -.309 .213 -  
PAC1000 -.165 -.113 -.012 -.156 -.248 -.015 .315 - 
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed) 
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed) 
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed) 
† - Dichotomous variable 





Hypotheses 1a and 1b test whether the profession discriminated in giving to members of 
committees having direct jurisdiction over SOX on the basis of party affiliation and 
speech performance.  To the extent that speech represents the reciprocal behavior that 
committee members exhibit in pay-for-performance contracts with their contributors, 
PAC contributions given by the profession should encourage the relatively pro-business 
Republican committee members to speak and advance the profession’s agenda during the 
hearings.  PAC contributions given to the opposition party should have the opposite 
effect.  That is, PAC contributions paid to the opposition represent hush money and Non-
republican committee members should reciprocate by remaining silent or softening their 
arguments. Therefore, PAC contributions should be positively associated with speech 
performance among Republicans and negatively associated with speech performance 
among Non-republicans. 
 
Preliminary analysis using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shown in table II-3 
provides some support for H1a. The profession allocated relatively more resources to 
speaking Republicans in the House than to non-speaking Republicans and all Non-
republicans regardless of whether they spoke or not. However, there was no significant 
difference between Non-republicans on the basis of their speech performance, and H1b is 
not supported. There was also no statistical difference in giving among speakers of either 





Table II-3. One-Way ANOVA House Financial Services Committee 







Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Non-speaking Non-Republican 14 10.471 11.91 0 30.92 
Speaking Non-Republican 18 6.7813 8.82 0 26.33 
Non-speaking Republican 26 13.011 8.32 0 27.32 
Speaking Republican 12 22.6323 11.84 4.5 43.50 
Superscripts indicate group membership (1,2,3) 
Difference between Group 1 and 2 significant at the .05 level equal variances assumed 
Difference between Group 3 significant at the .05 level unequal variances assumed 
 
Table II-4. One-Way ANOVA Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs  







Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Non-speaking Non-Republican - - - - - 
Speaking Non-Republican 11 4.69 7.90 0 27.05 
Non-speaking Republican 2 0.50 0.71 0 1.00 
Speaking Republican 8 15.02 12.08 0 35.56 
No statistical differences between groups. 
 
A more rigorous test of H1a and H1b was conducted using a tobit model with the number 
of sentences spoken during the hearings (TEXTUNIT) as the dependent variable and 
PAC contributions as the test variable.   Additional independent variables were selected 
based on previous research (Kathlene, 1994; Hall, 1987; Sinclair, 1983). These control 
variables include the party controlling the chair (REPPARTY), the position of the chair 
(CHAIR), freshman status (FRESH), legislative expertise (SENIORITY) and gender 
(MALE).  A positive relationship between PAC contributions and amount of speech 
would support the pay-for-performance contracting theory. It is necessary to control for 
party affiliation because rules for committee hearings grant each committee member 
equal amounts of time to speak or interrogate witnesses.  Since Republicans outnumbered 




time to speak than Non-republicans.  On the other hand, assuming the political ideologies 
of the parties differ and the introduced legislation reflects the controlling party’s agenda, 
the opposition may have a higher propensity to argue for changes to legislation that are 
more consistent with their party’s values.   With respect to SENIORITY, congressional 
members with more seniority in office should be more likely to speak since they are 
comfortable with the setting and less tenured members might defer relatively more of 
their speech time to senior party members.  The CHAIR position controls the agenda, 
directs the turns at talk, and naturally has more opportunity to speak.  The text units and 
turns at talk of the chair position were adjusted to eliminate instances of turn transition 
talk such as “Thank you very much.”   Control variables for freshman status and gender 
are also included based on the prior work of Hall (1987) and Kathlene (1994).  Hall 
(1987) detected less participation among freshman legislators (FRESH), including the 
frequency of their speech. Kathlene (1994) did not find any significant association among 
committee members between frequency of speech and Freshman status, but did find a 
negative association between frequency of speech and female gender (GENDER).  I have 
included all of these variables in the general form of the model shown below. 
 
TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + 
b5REPPARTY + b6PAC1000 
 
Where: 
TEXTUNITS = The number of sentences spoken during hearings. 




CHAIR  = Indicator variable for the legislator holding the committee chair position. 
FRESH = Indicator variable for freshman status, 1 = Freshman, 0 otherwise. 
GENDER = Indicator variable for Gender, 1 = male, 0 for female. 
REPPARTY = An indicator variable for political party affiliation.  1= Republican 
otherwise 0.  
PAC1000 = Political Action Committee contributions received from the accounting 
profession, scaled per $1,000 increments. 
 
The results from the House in table II-5 indicate that committee members’ overall 
propensity to speak during the hearings was positively associated with the chair position, 
PAC contributions and seniority, and negatively associated with the Republican Party.  
The results from the Senate indicate significant positive associations between speech 
performance and the chair position, seniority and freshman status. No significant 






Table II-5. Tobit model of Text units for U.S. House of Representatives 
House Financial Services Committee 
























CONSTANT +/- -109.03 59.51 -1.83 (.067) -41.87*  
SENIORITY + 13.82 3.83 3.61 (.000) 5.31** 8.54 
CHAIR + 317.19 169.10 1.88 (.061) 121.84* 0.01 
FRESH - 111.13 68.06 1.63 (.103) 42.69* 0.14 
GENDER + -58.23 50.04 -1.16 (.245) -22.37 0.81 
REPPARTY + -138.01 48.35 -2.85 (.004) -53.01** 0.54 
PAC1000 + 4.01 2.31 1.74 (.082) 1.54* 12.55 
N=70 
Sigma = 144.18   σ= 20.03  SE= 7.20   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -211.85 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 38.75 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.38 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.  
Marginal effects *=significant at the .10 level two-tailed **=significant at the .05 level two-tailed 
 
Table II-6. Tobit model of Text units for Senate Committee on Banking Housing and 
Urban Affairs 
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs 
























CONSTANT +/- -74.54 197.72 -0.38 (.706) -72.47  
SENIORITY + 27.20 7.21 3.77 (.000) 26.45** 8.00 
CHAIR + 1883.26 206.00 9.14 (.000) 1831.03** 0.04 
FRESH - 195.17 108.25 1.80 (.071) 189.75* 0.24 
GENDER + 17.97 175.44 0.10 (.918) 17.47 0.95 
REPPARTY + -64.48 77.87 0.83 (.408) -62.69 0.48 
PAC1000 + 3.44 3.14 1.10 (.273) 3.34 8.22 
N=21 
Sigma = 153.48 σ= 25.43 SE= 6.03   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -124.57 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 295.57 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.97 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 





The negative association between political party and speech was somewhat unexpected 
given that the Republicans controlled the committee chair and outnumbered their Non-
republican counterparts.  Committee rules allow equal time to each committee member 
for interrogating witnesses. One possible explanation might be that the Republicans 
stacked the witness list with pro-business experts and allowed them to speak longer 
uninterrupted during their allotted interrogation time.  The Non-republican committee 
members may have chosen to utilize more of their allotted time for personal expression 
rather than letting the witness respond.  This is somewhat supported by additional 
unreported regression results from the House indicating that Non-republican committee 
members asked significantly more narrow WH questions (Who, what, where, when) and 
polar yes/no questions than the Republicans. The narrow and polar yes/no questions do 
not allow a responding witness to elaborate as much, or for as long, as would occur if he 
or she is being asked broad how or why questions.  The strategic use of these types of 
questions may have allowed the Non-republicans to utilize relatively more of their 
allotted time to express their party’s viewpoint as opposed to letting a Republican 
selected witness express theirs.  In these regressions among the speakers in the Senate, 
Seniority was positive and significantly associated with all question types. 
 
In order to test the directional robustness of the PAC1000 variable, additional models 
were run on each respective party.  A positive coefficient for PAC1000 was expected for 
the Republican sample and a negative coefficient was expected for the Non-republican 
sample.   In partial support of H1a, the House results shown in table II-7 show a 




republicans.  Seniority remained statistically significant, but the association between 
speech and the chair position was not statistically significant among Republicans only.  
The results for the House Non-republicans were also not statistically significant and do 
not support H1b.  The results in the Senate again indicated that seniority was the only 
significant predictor of speech performance. 
 
Table II-7. Tobit model of Text units for U.S. House of Representatives Republicans 
House Financial Services Committee 
Republicans Only 























CONSTANT +/- -283.07 125.70 -2.25 (.024) -84.19**  
SENIORITY + 10.78 5.17 2.09 (.037) 3.21** 8.84 
CHAIR + 218.88 179.97 1.22 (.224) 65.10 0.03 
FRESH - 75.89 78.30 0.97 (.333) 22.57 0.18 
GENDER + -16.39 65.08 -0.25 (.801) -4.87 0.87 
PAC1000 + 7.54 3.83 1.97 (.049) 2.24** 16.05 
N=38 
Sigma = 115.16 σ= 26.17  SE= 4.40   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -84.04 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 21.67 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.30 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 






Table II-8. Tobit model of Text units for Senate Committee on Banking Housing and 
Urban Affairs Republicans 
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs 
Republicans Only 























CONSTANT +/- -97.98 114.79 -0.85 (.393) -68.30  
SENIORITY + 25.80 10.56 2.44 (.015) 17.99 8.00 
FRESH - -836.33 48101.18 -0.02 (.986) -583.01 0.10 
PAC1000 + 4.43 3.59 1.24 (.217) 3.09 12.11 
N=10 
Sigma = 152.11 σ= 38.86  SE= 3.92   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -52.53 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 107.84 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.70 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 
 
Secondary analysis using one-way ANOVA shown in table II-9 on the House indicates 
that more PAC contributions were given to silent pro-business Non-republicans than to 
silent pro-business Republicans and speaking pro-business Non-republicans.   Pro-
business status was determined by the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC) 
rating of the legislator’s voting record.  Legislators with USCC ratings in excess of 50% 
were considered pro-business.  These results indicate that the association between PAC 
contributions and Non-republican speech may be dependent on their having a pro-
business ideology.  That is, only some of the pro-business Non-republican members 
reciprocated by remaining silent in response to the PAC contributions. 
 
Additional results in the House sample show that, speaking or not, freshmen Republicans 




and unrated (freshmen) Non-republican committee members were significantly lower 
than the amounts given to all pro-business committee members and the unrated 
(freshmen) Republicans. This suggests among the House Financial Services Committee, 
the profession has an initial bias in giving toward Republican freshmen versus Non-
republican freshmen, but will give more to Non-republicans members as they 
demonstrate pro-business voting behavior.  Again, there were no significant differences 
between groups in the Senate. 
 
Table II-9. One-Way ANOVA House Financial Services Committee 








Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Liberal Dem/Ind Not Speaking 8 4.041 5.68 0.00 17.29 
Liberal Dem/Ind Speaking 12 4.501 7.93 0.00 26.33 
Freshman Dem/Ind Speaking or Not 3 8.271 6.19 2.50 14.81 
Pro-business Dem/Ind Speaking 5 12.1112 10.31 1.00 25.50 
Pro-business Rep Not Speaking 23 12.1412 8.22 0.00 24.00 
Pro-business Rep Speaking 8 18.64123 12.53 4.50 43.50 
Freshman Rep Not Speaking 3 19.62123 6.77 14.56 27.32 
Pro-Business Dem Not Speaking 4 24.2523 12.19 6.00 30.92 
Freshman Rep Speaking 4 30.603 4.51 26.50 37.00 
Superscripts indicate group membership (1,2,3) 
Means of groups 1,2 and 3 differ at the .05 level of significance (equal variances assumed) 
No significant differences detected assuming unequal variances. 
 
Overall, the results suggest there was a positive association between PAC contributions 
and speech among Republican committee members in the House.  This provides some 
support for H1a.  However, except for the final ANOVA test in table II-9, the association 
between PAC contributions among Non-republicans was not significant in either the 
House or the Senate committee hearings.  Therefore, the majority of the evidence does 





The second set of hypotheses predict that Republican recipients of PAC contributions are 
positively associated with the frequency that certain topics are mentioned and negatively 
associated with the frequency that Non-republicans mention them.  
To test this, I selected several relevant topics and tested for differences in the frequencies 
that each party mention them.  The topics and relative frequencies are shown in table II-
10. Tobit models were then run using the topic frequencies as the dependent variable and 
independent variables from the general model. Independent T-tests indicate that as a 
group, Non-republicans mentioned Consulting or Non-audit services and Rotation 
significantly more frequently than Republicans. These issues were particularly salient to 
the profession since prohibition of consulting services and mandatory rotation of audit 
firms would have a significant impact on firm specific revenue.   
 
Table II-10. Accounting Related Topics - House Financial Services Committee 
House Financial Services Committee 











Republican 20 4** 7* 8 1 
Non-republican 17 11** 26* 11 25 
* Significant at .10 





Table II-11. Frequency of Consulting as a Topic - House Sample 
House Financial Services Committee 
























CONSTANT +/- -5.77 2.04 -2.83 (.005) -0.81**  
SENIORITY + 0.31 0.10 3.17 (.002) 0.04** 8.54 
CHAIR + -2.37 3.36 -0.71 (.481) -0.33 0.01 
FRESH - 1.68 1.72 0.98 (.329) 0.24 0.14 
GENDER + 0.39 1.31 0.30 (.763) 0.06 0.81 
REPPARTY + -4.12 1.35 -3.04 (.002) -0.58** 0.54 
PAC1000 + 0.16 0.59 2.67 (.008) 0.02** 12.55 
N=70 
Sigma = 2.71   σ= 0.59  SE= 4.60   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -4918 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 0.19 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.14 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 
** Marginal effects significant at the .05 level two-tailed 
House Financial Services Committee 
Republican Only 
























CONSTANT +/- -13.37 5.93 -2.25 (.024) -0.01  
SENIORITY + 0.42 0.17 2.49 (.013) 0.00 8.84 
CHAIR + -9.36 4.68 -2.00 (.046) -0.00 0.03 
FRESH - 1.20 1.52 0.79 (.432) 0.00 0.18 
GENDER + 0.90 1.27 0.71 (.479) 0.00 0.87 
PAC1000 + 0.33 0.15 2.23 (.026) 0.00 16.04 
N=38 
Sigma = 2.71   σ= 0.59  SE= 4.60   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -4918 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 0.19 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.14 





The results of the analysis indicate that while controlling for political and structural 
factors, PAC contributions were positively associated with the frequency that House 
committee members mentioned Consulting or non-audit issues. Tobit was unable to 
estimate the model for rotation issues among the House committee members.  The results 
also indicate that Republican members mentioned consulting significantly less than Non-
republican members.  When the model was applied to the Republican members only, 
PAC contributions, seniority and the Chair were positive and significantly associated 
with the frequency that consulting was mentioned. 
 
Table II-12. Consulting Frequencies – Senate Sample 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
























CONSTANT +/- 6.33 6.86 0.92 (.356) 2.74  
SENIORITY + 0.14 0.26 0.56 (.574) 0.06 8.00 
CHAIR + 25.65 6.79 3.78 (.000) 11.11** 0.05 
FRESH - -1.15 4.29 -0.27 (.788) -0.50 0.24 
GENDER + -8.81 6.01 -1.47 (.142) -3.82 0.95 
REPPARTY + -0.92 3.07 -0.30 (.690) -0.40 0.48 
PAC1000 + -0.05 0.13 -0.40 (.690) -0.02 8.22 
N=21 
Sigma = 4.76   σ= 1.49  SE= 3.20   p-value= .000   
Log Likelihood function -27.50 
Conditional Mean at sample point: 1.53 
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0..43 
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables. 
**significant at the .05 level two-tailed 
 
 
Results from the Senate sample shown in table II-12 only indicated a positive and 




Sarbanes who received nothing from the accounting profession spoke about consulting 
and non-audit services more frequently than other Senate committee members. 
 
These results are consistent with the results on H1a and H1b. The implication of these 
results suggest that in the House, Republican recipients of PAC contributions from the 
profession reciprocated by discussing issues of relevance to the profession relatively 
more frequently than non-recipients.  These results provide some evidence that House 
committee members reciprocated in pay-for-performance contracts with PAC 




The third set of hypotheses predict that the relative frequency of persuasive markers will 
be positively associated with PAC contributions in Republican speech and negatively 
associated with Non-republican speech.  In order to measure the persuasiveness of 
language, I draw on empirical work in computerized corpus linguistics and construct 
linguistic variables related to the persuasiveness and force of speech.   
 
According to Zadeh (1975), linguistic variables are arrived at through fuzzy logic, or 
approximate reasoning. This is a mode of reasoning that is “not exact, or very inexact, but 




ill-defined to be amenable to description with conventional quantitative terms” (Zadeh, 
1975; p. 199).  Simply put, linguistic variables are variables whose values are words or 
sentences in either a natural or artificial language.  Zadeh (1975) describes them as a 
quintuple consisting of 1) the name of the variable, 2) the term set, or collection of its 
linguistic values, 3) a universe of discourse (i.e. language), 4) a syntactic rule that 
generates the terms in the term set, and 5) a semantic rule that associates each linguistic 
value with its meaning.  Linguistic fuzziness can be illustrated using the term ‘height’. 
Height is a term consisting of a term set. A person’s height can be described as short or 
tall in varying degrees, i.e. quite short, very short, or extremely short.  The term set may 
be infinite, i.e. very, very, very… short. A person can also be both short and tall, 
depending on the perspective of the observer.  Shortness can also refer to a degree of 
length, i.e. short or long, or to something ‘less than needed’, i.e. short on cash, short of 
the runway. So what does a statement like “Bill is short” mean? Fuzzy logic would apply 
a syntactic rule that says Bill is human, and human shortness usually refers to height, 
when not accompanied by an argument, such as ‘on cash’.  The semantic rule associated 
with this version of short usually means shorter than most, but taller than some. However, 
the definition of short is contingent, and the logic used to arrive at its meaning in context 
is fuzzy, not crisp.  More importantly, with respect to construct validity and linguistic 
variables, to the extent that the definition of a concept is contingent, so is its 
measurement. This problem is particularly acute with respect to some of the linguistic 
concepts used in prior research, such as transitivity or certainty. These concepts are 
global properties with multiple, normatively defined facets.  For example, transitivity 




‘carried over,’ or transferred from an agent to a patient13 in a sentence (Hopper & 
Thompson, 1980).  Likewise, Diction’s master variable for certainty consists of nine 
components14 based on the work of general semanticists, such as Alfred Korzybski, S.I 
Hayakawa and Wendell Johnson, in the 1940’s (Hart and Childers, 2004; Hart, 2001).  
While their definitions have a certain amount of face validity, it is unclear how to 
measure them and empirically establish their convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
In order to address this issue I draw on empirical research conducted in computerized 
corpus linguistics. Corpus linguistics generally refers to how features of spoken 
discourse, including rhetorical strategies, can be analyzed with the aid of corpora 
(collections of recorded utterances used as a basis for the descriptive analysis of a 
language).  McEnery and Wilson (1996) define a  corpus as “a body of text which is 
carefully sampled to be maximally representative of a language or language variety” (pp. 
87).  Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998) describe them as large, principled collections of 
naturally occurring text, and suggests their usefulness in analyzing large amounts of 
language collected from many speakers in order to draw empirically supported general 
conclusions regarding grammatical patterns.  The importance of corpora in linguistic 
analysis has been discussed at length (Biber, et al, 1998, Biber, 1988; Partington, 2003, 
1998; Kennedy, 1998; McEnery and Wilson, 1996), and generally, their value is 
perceived to be directly related to the degree that they represent the characteristics of the 
genre of language under study. Traditionally, corpus linguistics has concerned itself with 
lexicography, grammatical description and register studies, and not pragmatics15 or 




pragmatics and discourse analysis tend to rely on context, and corpora strip most of the 
context away (Partington, 2003; Biber, et al., 1998; McEnery and Wilson, 1996).  
Another reason given is that, until recently, there has been a paucity of complete corpora 




Research in corpus linguistics has revealed that linguistic features vary systematically 
depending on the specific speech situation in which they occur and the functions they are 
intended to serve. This is because people have mental frames or scripts gained from 
previous experience of what will happen in certain speech settings and adjust their 
expectations of their own and other’s behavior according to the context. A review of this 
research also suggests that the co-occurrence of certain linguistic features can indicate the 
force of the claims made, and whether they are offered as subordinated positions, or as 
recommended courses of action. In a seminal study, Biber (1988) found that linguistic 
structure in text varies depending on the nature of the speech17 situation and the intended 
function of the communication. In a factor analysis of twenty-three linguistic genres18 in 
two major corpora19, Biber (1988) found at least five dimensions of variation.  These 
were labeled 1) involved versus information production, 2) narrative versus non-narrative 
discourse, 3) elaborated versus situated dependent reference, 4) overt expression of 




be noted that Biber (1988) found no clear distinction between spoken and written English 
per se.  Rather, he found the variation within each mode of communication was often as 
great as the variation between them.  More importantly for the purposes of this study, 
Biber (1988) found a set of features labeled Overt Expression of Persuasion.  These 
features include prediction and possibility modals, suasive verbs, necessity modals, 
conditional subordination, infinitives and split auxiliaries.  Prediction modals (will, 
would, shall) and their contractions are used to refer to the future and are direct 
pronouncements that certain events will or will not occur. Possibility modals (can, may, 
might, could) are statements concerning the ability or possibility of certain events 
occurring, and are used to consider different perspectives on a problem.  When used with 
a first person agent, prediction and possibility modals indicate intention, e.g. I (we) will 
support, I might support.  In other cases, they can offer an assessment of likelihood, e.g. 
they will support, they might support.  Necessity modals and suasive verbs mark the 
author or speaker’s attempts to persuade the addressee that certain events are desirable. 
Necessity modals (ought, should, must) are pronouncements concerning the obligation or 
necessity of certain events while suasive verbs20 (e.g. demand, insist, propose) imply 
intention to bring about certain events in the future.  Conditional subordinators (if, 
unless) specify the conditions that are required for certain events to occur.  Infinitives (to 
plus the root of a verb) are commonly used as adjective and verb compliments.  In these 
constructions the head adjective or verb encodes the speakers attitude or stance toward 
the proposition encoded in the infinitival clause, e.g. happy to do it, hoped to see it.  Split 
auxiliaries occur when adverbs are placed in between an auxiliary and its main verb, e.g. 




split auxiliaries with these other features may be due to the fact that the auxiliaries are 
frequently modals rather than split auxiliaries being overt markers of persuasion. Texts 
with a high incidence of persuasive markers included professional letters, institutional 
letters and letters to the editor while broadcasts and press reviews contained notably few 
of them. Prepared and spontaneous speeches, official documents and academic prose 
were also relatively unmarked with respect to these features when compared to other 
texts.  
 
Another set of surface features not strictly associated with Biber’s (1988) dimension of 
overt argumentation yet of interest to this analysis include downtoners, hedges, amplifiers 
and emphatics.  Downtoners (almost, barely, hardly) have a general lowering effect on 
the force of the verb.  Biber (1988) notes that while downtoners can mark uncertainty 
towards a proposition they may also mark politeness or deference toward an addressee.   
Hedges (maybe, sort of, kind of ) are less specific markers of probability.  Whereas 
downtoners give some indication of the level of uncertainty hedges simply mark a 
proposition as uncertain.  Amplifiers (absolutely, completely, extremely) boost the effect 
of a verb and can be used to indicate certainty or conviction towards a proposition, as 
well as signal solidarity with the listener.  The relation between emphatics (very, really, 
just, most, more) and amplifiers is similar to that between hedges and downtoners, in that 
emphatics simply mark the presence of certainty while amplifiers indicate the degree of 
certainty toward a proposition.   Illustrations of the use of these markers in discourse 
analysis are presented in Appendix II-2. I draw on this literature in the following analysis 




them in context of public debate.  The variables and related term sets used in this analysis 
are identified in Table II-13.  
 
Table II-13. Linguistic Variables  
Variable Term Set 




Emphatics [A lot|Do|For sure|Just|More|Most|Real|Really|So|Such a] 
Predictive modals [Shall|Will|Would|Won’t] 





Possibility modals [Can|Could|May|Might] 
Downtoners [Almost|Barely|Hardley|Merely|Nearly|Only|Partially|Partly 
|Practically|Slightly|Somewhat] 
Hedges [Almost|At about|Kind of|Maybe|More or less 
|Something like|Sort of] 
Source: Biber (1988) 
 
 All frequencies are first normalized to a text length of 1,000 sentences so that the 
frequency values for different speakers are comparable. Thus if necessity modals are 
spoken 220 times over 3,217 sentences, then the normalized frequency of occurrence 
would be 68 times per 1,000 sentences. The normalization process allows the frequencies 
of occurrence for each speaker to be directly comparable to one another.  The normalized 
frequencies can then be standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Thus, if the normalized mean of necessity modals was 68 with a standard deviation of 65 
and speaker A used this feature 17 times over 56 sentences, then they would have a 
standardized score of 3.62 [17/56*1000)=3.62*65+68] on this feature.  The standard 




relative to other speakers at the hearings. The normalized frequencies and Z scores for the 
linguistic variables in the House and Senate samples are shown in tables II-14 and II-15. 
 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that there will be a positive association between PAC 
contributions and markers of persuasive speech among Republicans, and a negative 
association among Non-republicans. The results of independent T-tests on the House 
sample indicate that, on average, Non-republicans used persuasive markers more 
frequently in their speech than Republicans. Significant differences existed on all 
linguistic variables in the House sample with the exception of suasive verbs and 
predictive modals. The results among Senate committee members was the opposite.  In 
the Senate sample, the only linguistic variable with a significantly different frequencies 
of usage between Republicans and Non-republicans was for suasive verbs.  Non-
republicans Senate committee members used significantly more suasive verbs than 
Republicans. These results may be due to differences in the controlling party, and/or to 
contextual differences between the House and Senate speech settings. 
 
The results of the multivariate GLM model shown at the bottom of Table II-13 provide 
partial support for H3a indicating a positive and significant association between the usage 
of persuasive markers and PAC contributions among Republican committee members in 
the House.  Consistent with previous results, there was no significant association among 
House Non-republicans.  There were no also no significant associations detected in the 





Table II-14. Frequencies of Linguistic Variables – House Financial Services Committee 
House Financial Services Committee 
Normalized Frequencies of Selected Linguistic Variables* 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Necessity modals 70 23.70 50.55 0 303.57 
Amplifiers 70 17.73 38.53 0 250.00 
Emphatics 70 50.49 80.08 0 343.75 
Predictive modals 70 50.07 74.10 0 270.27 
Suasive verbs 70 15.67 29.04 0 135.14 
Possibility modals 70 59.11 89.72 0 371.79 
Downtoners 70 6.65 19.60 0 125.00 
Hedges 70 10.75 21.71 0 100.00 
*Normalized to text length of 1000 sentences 
Standardized Scores of Selected Linguistic Variables 
Z-Variables N Party Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error P-value 
32 Non-republican 0.23 1.24 0.22 Necessity modals 
38 Republican -0.19 0.70 0.11 
.096* 
32 Non-republican 0.28 1.34 0.24 Amplifiers 
38 Republican -0.23 0.48 0.08 
.050* 
32 Non-republican 0.33 1.61 0.21 Emphatics 
38 Republican -0.28 0.75 0.12 
.014* 
32 Non-republican 0.16 1.02 0.18 Predictive modals 
38 Republican -0.14 0.97 0.16 
.210 
32 Non-republican -0.04 0.83 0.15 Suasive verbs 
38 Republican 0.03 1.13 0.18 
.760 
32 Non-republican 0.26 1.07 0.19 Possibility modals 
38 Republican -0.22 0.90 0.15 
.051* 
32 Non-republican 0.27 1.38 0.24 Downtoners 
38 Republican -0.22 0.40 0.07 
.060* 
32 Non-republican 0.23 1.20 0.21 Hedges 
38 Republican -0.20 0.76 0.12 
.083* 
*Significant at .10 (Two tailed) 
House Financial Services Committee 
Multivariate General Linear Model 
Republicans Only 





Nec. Amp. Emph Pred Sua Poss Down Hedge 
CONSTANT +/- -0.218 -0.520 -0.712 -0.570 -0.161 -0.702 -0.179 -0.501 
 P-value (.313) (.000) (.002) (.052) (.641) (.009) (.152) (.031) 
PAC1000 + 0.002 0.018* 0.027* 0.027* 0.012 0.030* 0.003 0.019 
 P-value (.888) (.015) (.020) (.079) (.505) (.030) (.665) (.115) 
 Adj. R2 - .129 .118 .058 - .099 - .042 






Table II-15. Frequencies of Linguistic Variables – Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Development  
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development 
Normalized Frequencies of Selected Linguistic Variables* 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Necessity modals 21 44.82 42.88 0 176.47 
Amplifiers 21 51.85 36.18 0 117.65 
Emphatics 21 95.62 61.82 0 193.33 
Predictive modals 21 102.02 50.96 0 184.47 
Suasive verbs 21 17.84 19.81 0 78.13 
Possibility modals 21 87.84 45.43 0 170.73 
Downtoners 21 8.89 10.40 0 40.00 
Hedges 21 15.97 13.66 0 38.46 
*Normalized to text length of 1000 sentences 
Standardized Scores of Selected Linguistic Variables 
Z-Variables N Party Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error P-value 
11 Non-republican 0.11 0.77 0.23 Necessity modals 
10 Republican -0.12 1.23 0.39 
.621 
11 Non-republican 0.11 0.93 0.28 Amplifiers 
10 Republican -0.13 1.11 0.35 
.594 
11 Non-republican 0.24 0.89 0.27 Emphatics 
10 Republican -0.27 1.09 0.35 
.254 
11 Non-republican 0.30 0.66 0.20 Predictive modals 
10 Republican -0.33 1.23 0.39 
.175 
11 Non-republican 0.49 1.12 0.34 Suasive verbs 
10 Republican -0.54 0.44 0.14 
.013* 
11 Non-republican 0.22 0.64 0.19 Possibility modals 
10 Republican -0.24 1.29 0.41 
.310 
11 Non-republican 0.30 1.13 0.34 Downtoners 
10 Republican -0.33 0.76 0.24 
.152 
11 Non-republican 0.28 1.07 0.32 Hedges 
10 Republican -0.30 0.86 0.27 
.190 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study tested three sets of complimentary hypotheses regarding the association 
between PAC contributions given by the accounting profession and speech performance 
among members of congressional committees having jurisdiction over SOX.  The 
hypotheses suggest that PAC contributions represent pay-for-performance contracts and 
that legislators reciprocated by altering their speech performance during public hearings 
related to SOX.  Specifically, the hypotheses suggest that Republican committee 
members receiving PAC contributions reciprocated by increasing their rhetoric in support 
of the profession’s agenda.  In addition the hypotheses predicted that Non-republican 
members receiving PAC contributions from the profession reciprocated by remaining 
silent or decreasing the quantity or quality of their rhetoric against the profession’s 
agenda.  A significant association between PAC contributions and committee member’s 
speech performance during public debate concerning policy formulation would be 
consistent with a theory of political influence exerted by the accounting profession.   
 
The results among the House Financial Services Committee indicate positive and 
significant associations between PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession 
and Republican speech performance. The first indication is that the profession paid 




Republicans.  In addition, the number of text units (sentences) spoken by House 
Republican committee members was also positive and significantly associated with PAC 
contributions paid by the profession.  The frequency that House Republicans mentioned 
consulting and non-audit services was also positive and significantly associated with 
PAC contributions. Finally, there was a positive association between PAC contributions 
and markers of persuasive speech among House Republican committee members.  
 
The implication of these findings is that House Republicans tend to reciprocate with their 
PAC contributors by engaging in debate during committee hearings, speaking more when 
they do engage in debate, discussing topics relevant to their contributors more frequently 
and using relatively more markers of persuasion in their speech. The results on House 
Non-republican committee members and members of the Senate committee do not 
support a theory of pay-for-performance contracting.   
 
There are numerous limitation on the results of this study. First, the text samples analyzed 
were limited to the members of the House Financial Services Committee during three 
days of public hearings and ten days of hearing in the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Development concerning SOX.   Consequently, the results cannot be 
generalized to other committees, time-periods or topics.  Second, the theory put forth in 
this study should be critically evaluated.  Extant theory on the speech behavior of 
legislative committees is scant and needs further development.  Finally, to the extent that 
this theory is incomplete or incorrect directly affects the specification of the empirical 






An illustration of how some of these features are associated with persuasive argument is 
shown in the following modal analysis of ranking minority member Rep. John LaFalce’s 
(D-NY) opening statement before the House Committee on Financial Services on March 
13, 2002.  This analysis is conducted with the aid of a concordance program. A 
concordance program identifies and retrieves all instances of a word or a string of words 
in a text along with the surrounding context.  Concordancing for all instances of the 
necessity and possibility modals ‘can’ ‘may’ might’ ‘should’ and ‘must’ in the text helps 
to construct the minority argument that the SEC budget should be tripled (see text lines 
T2, T6) since boards of directors were too passive (T3) in responding to earnings 
manipulation by management (T4-5).  Lafalce also uses two necessity modals to demand 
meaningful oversight of the audit profession (T8) and to reform of the functioning of 
audit committees (T9). 
T1) We have to sort through them and try to come to some consensus. I hope we can do that. 
T2) Second, and this is something that I think we can now agree on, and I will finish up, I called 
for the 200 to 300 percent increase in the SEC budget. 
T3) Very often, unchecked by the board of directors for one reason or another, because of a policy 
passivity that may have existed at too many boards, because of the same stock options to a 
lesser extent to be sure that corporate officers, their chief desire is not a better product or a 
better service, but market capitalization, to drive capitalization. 
T4) The SEC, as you know, was tripling the number of mandated restatements, which was at least 
some indication that something might well be wrong. 
T5) And there was too much of an incentive it seemed to me within corporate America, 
particularly because of the compensation mechanisms that have evolved over the years, for 
earnings manipulation, for revenue recognition when it should not be recognized, for channel 
stuffing, cookie jar reserves, and so forth, and so forth. 
T6) Now nobody was paying attention in this committee when we were considering the SEC fee 
reduction bill, I said what we should be considering in the first instance is not a 2 or 3 percent 
increase in the SEC budget, but a 200 or 300 percent increase in the SEC budget, because of 
what is going on. 




T8) We must also provide for meaningful oversight of the audit profession. 
T9) We must reform the functioning of audit committees and the boards of directors of public 
companies to ensure that independent directors are truly independent and that auditors are 
working for the shareholders, not for the management. 
 
Using the same method, we can see the president and CEO of the AICPA, Barry 
Melancon, respond to Lafalce’s attack on the profession cautioning against a rush to 
legislation (T1), and making the point that financial statements are created by the 
company (i.e. management’s representations) (T2).  The preferred solution (i.e. reforming 
the functioning of audit committees) is emphasized in T3-4 continuing Melancon’s  
theme that management is responsible for financial statement disclosure. Curiously, the 
only instances of ‘must’ occur in reference to countries that tried and discarded 
mandatory auditor rotation (T6) (ostensibly because it was a bad idea), and in a vague 
demand to ‘modernize business reporting’ (T7). 
T1) But we all should be wary of proposals that can lead to unintended consequences. 
T2) We should all recognize that the financial reporting process is a complex system of checks 
and balances that begins with the creation of the financial statement by the company. 
T3) To enhance this first step in the process, the audit committee should also have the sole 
authority to approve the company's financial statements and require business disclosures in the 
annual report and other public documents. 
T4) And the audit committee should be responsible for the hiring and firing of the company's 
auditor. 
T5) Equally important, it should be composed of outside directors with auditing, accounting, or 
financial experience. 
T6) Finally, I must mention that at one time Canada, Greece, Spain, and Italy all required 
mandatory audit firm rotation in one form or another. Three of those four countries 
subsequently dropped the requirement. 
T7) Efforts to modernize business reporting must be accelerated. 
 
As these examples show, concordancing for modals can be a very useful linguistic 
analysis tool for discourse analysis.  An analysis of the frequency of use of amplifiers, 
emphatics, downtoners and hedges respect to specific topics by specific speakers can also 
provide an indication of the level of force associated with an argument.  For example, the 




Affairs hearing on March 14, 2002 indicate the AICPA was very concerned with who 
would serve on any independent oversight board. 
We believe that there should be very careful consideration as to how members of the public body 
would be nominated and in terms of their terms and the background of the people that would serve 
on such an important body. (Mr. Castellano, Chairman AICPA, 3/14/02). 
 
I hope we would look to some of the improvements made in the corporate governance structure 
and apply some of those very same safeguards and checks and balances to a body such as this. I 
think it is very important, and Mr. Castellano's point about the nominating process is extremely 
important. (Ms. Kirtley, Former Chairman AICPA, 3/14/02). 
 
Likewise Senator Gramm, demonstrating solidarity with the profession, hedges on the 
idea of non-accountants sitting on the board.  
I guess my own views are that if you are going to have an ethics subpanel, that perhaps there is 
some logic to having maybe even a majority of people who are non-CPA's. (Senator Gramm, 
3/14/02). 
 
This qualified conciliation however, sets the stage for a counter-proposal that a 
supermajority should be required for the board to initiate any action.  
When we are setting accounting standards, I have to admit that it frightens me to have 
nonaccountants in the majority in setting such standards. And when we are setting those standards, 
maybe we ought to require a super-majority of the panel, no matter how it is made up. (Senator 
Gramm, 3/14/02) 
 
In this statement Sen. Gramm conflates accounting standards with ethical standards in 
order to warrant his claim that the ethics subpanel should contain a majority of 
accountants.  The only obvious support for this claim is his fear of non-accountants.  
It is also important to note that these markers can be used simultaneously with 
countervailing effects. For example, the witness in the passage below employs an 
amplifier (absolutely) in an attempt to agree with Chairman Sarbanes, but subordinates 
the clause (to the extent, then) to a possibility modal (may) blunting the message of 
solidarity. 
To the extent that any of our consulting services may put us in the position of management, then 




Balhoff, Chairman AICPA Public Company Practice Section, 3/14/02). 
 
These examples indicate how modals, downtoners, hedges, amplifiers and emphatics can 
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1 www.crp.org 
2 This includes contributions from individuals ($6,903,477), PACs ($5,788,177) and soft money 
contributions ($2,662,402) 
3 This includes all lobbying expenditures for calendar years 1999 and 2000. 
105 
4 A bill is the most common form of congressional action.  A bill originating in the House of 
Representatives is designated H.R. followed by a number that it retains throughout all of its parliamentary 
stages.  Bills originating in the Senate are designated S followed by a number.  The Speaker then refers the 
bill to the appropriate committee having jurisdiction over the area affected by the measure.  Committee 
action is a very important phase of the legislative process since it is where the most intense consideration is 
given to a measure and when various people are given the opportunity to be heard.  Usually, the first step of 
a committee is the process of holding a public hearing where committee members hear from witnesses 
representing various viewpoints on the measure.  Transcripts of the testimony taken at the hearing are 
publicly available in the committee office.  After the hearings are completed, the bill is considered in a 




                                                                                                                                                 
detail and offer amendments for acceptance or rejection.  This process can take place at either the sub-
committee level or the full committee level. At the end of discussion the committee members vote on the 
action to be taken with respect to the bill.  A bill can be ‘reported’ with or without amendment or ‘tabled’ 
with no further action taken.  After a bill has been reported, the Committee writes a report describing the 
purpose and scope of the measure and why it recommends approval.  The bill is then considered by the full 
House under a ‘rule’ that sets out the particulars of debate, such as the time allowed for discussion and 
whether or not amendments can be offered.  After all debate is concluded and amendments agreed upon the 
House may then vote to ‘recommit’ the bill to committee or vote on final passage. Efforts to recommit a 
bill are usually made by opponents attempting to get the bill tabled.  After a bill passes the House it goes to 
the Senate for consideration.  A bill must pass both the House and the Senate before it can be presented to 
the President for signature into law.  If the Senate changes the language of the bill, it must go back to the 
House for concurrence or additional changes.  Often a conference committee with both House and Senate 
members is established to handle this ‘back and forth’ negotiation and to resolve differences.  Conference 
committees also issue reports outlining the final version of the bill.  Once a bill has passed in both the 
House and Senate it is considered ‘enrolled’ and sent to the President who can sign the measure into law, 
veto it and return it to Congress, let it become law without signature, or ‘pocket veto’ it at the end of the 
legislative session. 
5 Both the Flesch index and the Flesch-Kincaid index use a combination of sentence length and syllable 
count to measure the difficulty of a text. The Flesch test is expressed as 206.935-((Lx1.015)+(Sx0.846)) 
where L is mean sentence length and S is the number of syllables per 100 words.  The lower the score the 
more difficult the passage. See Jones and Shoemaker (1994). 
6 DICTION text analysis software was developed by Dr. Roderick P. Hart and is available through Sage 
Publications at www.scolari.com.  Diction 5.0 uses dictionaries (word-lists) to search a text along five 
dimensions labeled: Certainty, Activity, Optimism, Commonality and Realism. Certainty refers to the level 
of resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness in a text and the tendency to speak ex-cathedra. Activity 
refers to language featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia. 
 Optimism refers to language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive 
entailments. Commonality refers to language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting 
idiosyncratic modes of engagement. Realism refers to language describing tangible, immediate, 
recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives. 
7 Word variables were constructed as the number of common occurrences for each keyword and composites 
divided by the total number of words in the narrative.  Theme variables were constructed as the sum of 
frequencies of keyword combinations occurring in sentences divided by the total number of sentences in 
the statement. 
8 Passive constructions are created by having the subject acted upon rather than performing the action 
expressed by the verb.  For example, “The boy hit the ball.” Is constructed using the active voice whereas, 
“The ball was hit (by the boy.)” is constructed using the passive voice.  In agentless passive constructions, 
the agent, (the boy), is omitted and inferred by the reader in context.  Agentless passive constructions are 
associated with lower transitivity.  See Footnote 9 for a more complete description of transitivity. 
9 Full transcripts of committee hearings including witness lists, prepared statements and additional material 
supplied for the record are available from through the government printing office access website at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov  
10 See “Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 
107th Congress, Second Session, Volume I on the Legislative History of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection issues raised by Enron and other public companies” available 
at the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO access DocID: f:87708v1.wais 
11 Committee members were dichotomized into those with U.S. Chamber of Commerce ratings above 50% 
and those with ratings below 50%.  Committee members with USCC ratings above 50% are considered 
pro-business while those with ratings lower than 50% are considered pro-social.   
12 The ten components described by Hopper and Thompson (1980) in explaining the notion of transitivity 
include: “A) Participants - No transfer can take place unless at least two participants are involved.  B) 
Kinesis – Actions can be transferred from one participant to another; states cannot.  Thus something 




                                                                                                                                                 
i.e. a telic action, is more effectively transferred to a patient than one not provided with such an endpoint.  
In the telic sentence I ate it up, the activity is viewed as completed, and the transferal is carried out in its 
entirety; but in the atelic I am eating it, the transferal is only partially carried out. D) Punctuality – Actions 
carried out with no obvious transitional phase between inception and completion have a more marked effect 
on their patients than actions that are inherently on-going.  Contrast Kick (punctual) with Carry (non-
punctual).  E) Volitionality -  The effect on the patient is typically more apparent when the A is presented 
as acting purposefully; Contrast I wrote your name (volitional) with I forgot your name (non-volitional).  F) 
Affirmation – this is the affirmative/negative parameter.  G) Mode – This refers to the distinction between 
‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ encoding of events.  An action which either did not occur, or which is presented as 
occurring in a non-real (contingent) world, is obviously less effective than one whose occurrence is actually 
asserted as corresponding directly with a real event.  H) Agency – It is obvious that participants high in 
Agency can affect a transfer of an action in a way that those low in Agency cannot. Thus, the normal 
interpretation of George startled me is that of a perceptible event with perceptible consequences; but that of 
The picture startled me could be completely a matter of an internal state…I) Affectedness of O – the degree 
to which an action is transferred to a patient…it is done more effectively in I drank up the milk than in I 
drank some of the milk…J) Individuation –refers to the distinctness of the patient from the A,  and to its 
distinctness from its own background” (pp. 252).  Referents of nouns with the following properties are 
more individuated/non individuated: 1) proper vs. common, 2) human, animate vs. inanimate, 3) concrete 
vs. abstract, 4) singular vs. plural, 5) count vs. mass, 6) referential, definite vs. non-referential. 
(Timberlake, 1975). 
13 The term patient refers to the receiver of an action in a cardinal transitive relationship.  ‘A’ (for agent) 
and ‘O’ (for object) refer to the two participants in a two-participant clause.  See Dixon (1979). 
14 In Diction analysis, the master variable for certainty is composed of the sum of variables representing 
tenacity, leveling, collectives and insistence, less the sum of variables representing numerical terms, 
ambivalence, self-reference and variety (Hart, 2004). “Additive variables: Tenacity: All uses of the verb “to 
be” (is, am, will, shall ), three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all 
associated contractions (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t). These verbs connote confidence and totality. Leveling:Words 
used to ignore individual differences and build a sense of completeness and assurance. Included are 
totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, 
consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut). Collectives: 
Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease specificity. These words reflect a dependence 
on categorical modes of thought. Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups 
(army, congress, legislature, staff ), and geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, republic). 
Insistence: This is a measure of code restriction and semantic “contentedness.” The assumption is that 
repetition of key terms indicates a preference for a limited, ordered world. In calculating this measure, all 
words occurring three or more times that function as nouns or noun-derived adjectives are identified and 
the following calculation performed: (number of eligible words ¥ sum of their occurrences) Subtractive 
variables:Numerical terms: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given case. This dictionary 
treats each isolated integer as a single “word” and each separate group of integers as a single word. In 
addition, the dictionary contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, zero) as well as 
terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, multiply, percentage) and quantitative topics 
(digitize, tally, mathematics). The presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper-specify a claim, thus 
detracting from its universality. Ambivalence: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a 
speaker’s inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being made. Included are hedges 
(allegedly, perhaps, might), and statements of inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and 
confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate). Also included are words of restrained possibility (could, would, he’d 
) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, seems). Self-reference: All first-person references, including I, I’d, 
I’ll, I’m, I’ve, me, mine, my, and myself. Self-references are treated as acts of “indexing” whereby the locus 
of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world at large (thereby implicitly acknowledging 
the speaker’s limited vision). Variety: This measure conforms to Wendell Johnson’s (1946) type-token 
ratio, which divides the number of different words in a passage by the passage’s total words. A high score 





                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 Pragmatics has been defined as ‘meaning in context’ (Partington, 2003). 
16 There appears to be some confusion regarding the term ‘discourse’.  Partington (2003) has used it to 
include “any stretch of language in its authentic context” (p.262), while others (Kennedy, 1998) use it to 
refer only to language in its spoken form. 
17 Although speech refers to strictly to the expression of thoughts or exchange of ideas using spoken words, 
I will use the term speech and speaker interchangeably with message and addressor. 
18 The written genres included press reportage, editorials, press reviews, religion, skills and hobbies, 
popular lore, biographies, official documents, academic prose, general fiction, mystery fiction, science 
fiction, adventure fiction, romantic fiction, humor, and personal and professional letters.  The spoken 
genres included face-to-face conversation, telephone conversation, public conversations, debates and 
interviews, broadcast, spontaneous speeches and planned speeches. 
19 The two corpora used in Biber (1988) included the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) Corpus of British 
English and the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English.  Biber (1988) also added a collection of personal 
and professional letters since the standard corpora do not include non-published written texts. 
20 Biber (1988) used the list of suasive verbs found in Quirk, Randolph; Greenbaum, Sidney; Leech, 
Geoffrey; and Svartvik, Jan (1985) A Comprehensive Grammar of The English Language, Longman. 
London.  Another source for these words is “English verb classes and alternations: A preliminary 









According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of 
Professional Conduct, members should “act in a way that will serve the public interest” 
defined as “the collective well-being of the community of people and institutions the 
profession serves”.  Specifically, the code defines the accounting profession’s public as 
“clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and financial 
community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified public 
accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce1 ”.  In this paper I suggest 
that by failing to explicitly identify with specific interests and by including anyone who 
relies on the orderly functioning of commerce within its public, the profession has tacitly 
promised to act as the ultimate social mediator.  This is a role it cannot possibly fulfill 
given the inevitable and often intractable conflicts among interests and the bounded 
nature of human intellect and ability.  As a consequence, the image of the accounting 





One of the hallmarks of a profession is its stated responsibility to serve the public interest 
(Kultgen 1988).  The public interest model of the professions depicts this commitment as 
one that obligates professionals to place the goal of service to society ahead of self-
interest considerations.  According to this model, a fiduciary responsibility is imposed on 
professionals to act competently and altruistically on behalf of the public because their 
services are both indispensable and difficult for laypersons to evaluate.  This goal of 
selfless service is further portrayed as an appropriate offering by a professional group in 
exchange for the monopoly of service and self-regulation that the state grants to licensed 
professions.  Without this commitment to the public good, providers of expert services 
could use their informational and market advantages to extract monopoly rents from users 
of their services.   
 
Conflict models of the professions, on the other hand, question the face value of public 
interest commitments offered by professions (Kultgen 1988; Roberts and Dwyer 1998). 
Although declarations of this public interest commitment are proclaimed in codes of 
ethics and policy statements of professions, conflict models argue that powerful private 
interests are driving the rhetoric used in communications to regulators, legislators and the 
public (Canning and O’Dwyer 2003; Roberts and Dwyer 1998; Willmott 1986).  
According to this view, the professional ideals of altruism, meritocracy and collegiality 
are not portrayed as truly representing reality.  Conflict models depict professional 
institutions as seeking to perpetuate a mystique surrounding their work product in order 
to hinder critical evaluation of their services and insulate their members from outside 




and the right to self-regulation, thus maintaining a position of dominance whereby they 
can exploit the very public they claim to serve.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the public interest ideal as 
promulgated by the public accounting profession in the United States (hereinafter the 
Profession) and explore what motivates the profession to invoke public interest 
arguments in various contexts.   In so doing, I also explore the elasticity and ambivalence 
of the term public interest while arguing that it is in and of itself part of the mystification 
process used by the profession to maintain its self-regulatory status.   
 
I approach my analysis from three different perspectives.  The first perspective analyzes 
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric.  I define 
rhetoric in the traditional Aristotelian sense, i.e. as persuasive appeals based on logic, 
emotion and/or authority while assuming a functionalist perspective consistent with the 
public interest model of the professions.  I illustrate how the profession uses the rhetoric 
of the public interest as a measure of proper comportment for its members, to reassure 
regulators and the investing public of the benevolent motivations of the profession, and to 
maintain the stability of global capital markets.  
 
The second approach adopts a critical perspective.   This view eschews any altruistic 
motivations on behalf of the profession and casts the language of the public interest as 
propaganda intended to support the economic objectives of professional elites in a highly 




I illustrate the instrumental use of the public interest ideal by the accounting profession to 
defend its self-regulatory status in times of crisis, as justification to extend its 
jurisdictional claims and to minimize its exposure to liability from audit failures.   
 
The final perspective focuses on the ambivalence of language and attempts to reveal how 
the true nature of the public interest is ‘undecidable’.   This perspective deconstructs the 
public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of elements including cultural 
values, political doctrine and contingent interests. I use the term myth as both allegory 
and parable.  Myths are similar to allegory in the in the sense that they exist as symbolic 
representations for meanings other than those indicated on the surface.  They are also 
similar to parables, being fictitious stories illustrating historically embedded moral 
attitudes. I rely on myths as the symbolic representations of an ideal reality to describe 
the simultaneous and contradictory attitudes present in the public interest ideal and the 
inherent instability between what is written and what is read, or what is spoken and what 
is heard.   A deconstructive reading of the public interest ideal reveals how its central 
meaning is always on the move, uniquely reified by readers in context and how any fixed 
meaning cannot be sustained.  I believe that this paper advances prior critical work 
because I focus on the instrumental use of the public interest ideal as a rhetorical strategy 
while acknowledging and addressing the differences in meaning attached to the use of 





THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS RHETORIC 
 
“By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it.” Adam Smith – Wealth of Nations, Chapter 2 
 
Rhetoric has been defined as the management of symbols in order to coordinate social 
action (Cooper, 1989).  This definition implies that a message has been constructed to 
achieve a purposive result.  It follows then that a rhetorical analysis requires an 
examination of the symbols used with the principal objective of uncovering the message 
and original intent of the message maker.  According to Aristotle (Trans. 1954), rhetoric, 
or persuasive appeals, can be logical (logos), emotional (pathos), and/or ethical (ethos).  
Logical arguments appeal to the reasoning and intellect of an audience while emotional 
arguments are usually characterized by vivid and emotionally loaded language.  Logical 
arguments seek a cognitive and rational response from the audience while emotional 
arguments seek to reshape the state of mind of the audience to order to obtain the most 
productive reception of a message. Ethos, on the other hand refers to the character or 
qualifications of the speaker. Appeals based on ethos generally attempt to persuade an 
audience by projecting the author’s authority, reliability and competence.  
 
From an ethos perspective there is a long established authoritative basis for linking the 
concept of financial reporting with the public interest.  The Securities Act of 1934 




production of periodic reports. Section 2 concerning the necessity for such regulation 
firmly states that “…transactions in securities [ ] are affected with a national public 
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such 
transactions and practices…”  Since that time, professional and political discourse 
concerning accounting has promulgated and reified the term ‘public interest’ into a 
condensation symbol representing the standard of goodness by which all political and 
professional acts can be measured (Sarat, 2002).  As such, it also represents an emotional 
appeal, condensing into a single term all socially held beliefs regarding how governments 
and professions should act, especially given their appropriation of self-regulatory power.  
Authoritative and emotional appeals to “serve the public interest” motivate auditors to act 
independently and also notify the investing public of the benevolent purpose and 
intention of the profession.  Actions seen ‘in the public interest’ are perceived of as 
‘good’ and therefore deserving of approval, so it is not surprising that the accounting 
profession has appropriated and cloaked itself in the rhetoric of the ‘public interest’, 
applying the term liberally in its public communications. 
 
These public interest claims can also be argued on the basis of logic. Logical appeals are 
normally conveyed as deductive syllogisms or enthymemes. A syllogism consists of at 
least three parts: a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion.  They are usually 
deductive in the sense that they move from general ideas to increasingly more specific 
conclusions. The major premise is usually a universal observation that an audience can 
generally accept as true. The minor premise then recasts one object from the major 




regarding the subject by showing it to be a subset of the universal premise. For example, 
most Americans would accept the premise that economic activity is good for society as a 
whole. Consequently, a speaker who successfully argues that capital markets aid in 
economic growth can logically claim that capital markets are good for society. Likewise, 
to the extent that a speaker can convince the audience that auditors are necessary for the 
proper functioning of capital markets, they should also be successful in claiming that 
auditors themselves are good for society. As long as the foundational premises are true, 
then valid conclusions can logically follow.   
 
Enthymemes, on the other hand, are simply syllogisms with omitted premises.  For 
example, a speaker can simply state that ‘auditors serve the public interest’ based on the 
commonly held warrants that: 1) everything good for society is in the public interest, 2) 
proper functioning capital markets are good for society, and 3) competent and 
independent auditors are necessary for the proper functioning of capital markets.  Each of 
the supporting sub-claims represent claims in their own right.  Each is warranted by their 
own data, beliefs or authority and so on, in an ever-extending logical chain of reasoning.  
For example, the claim that auditors serve the public interest might also be supported by 
the arguments that 1) Professional auditors assist capital markets by ensuring the 
production of unbiased and accurate information to be used by managers, investors and 
creditors in making rational economic decisions regarding the allocation of capital and 
resources;  2) Proper functioning capital markets decrease transaction costs and therefore 
the cost of capital to marginal investment increasing aggregate economic output and 




population, and 3) Given the result that efficient markets ensure optimal allocation of 
resources and maximum aggregate utility, auditors are fulfilling a critical role necessary 
for a successful society.  Such a rational and coherent argument is difficult to refute, 
especially when respected experts have quantified it and supported it with empirical 
evidence gathered under rigorous scientific conditions.  
 
The public interest ideal of the accounting profession can also be diagrammed using 
Toulmin’s (1969) model of argument.  The basic model consists of three principal 
components and three sub-components.  The three main components of the model consist 
of a claim, or assertion that an advocate wants the audience to accept followed by data 
provided in support of the claim and warrants, or the assumptions necessary to bridge 
between the data and the claim. The three sub-components consist of qualifiers that 
indicate the strength of the claim being made, backing, or additional data presented to 
bolster the warrants, and a rebuttal, or statement specifying when the claim would not 
follow from the data presented. Thus, the argument that auditors serve the public interest 




Figure III-1: Model of the public interest argument 
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The data originates in the demand for accurate and timely financial information by 
external investors and creditors.  This data leads to the claim that auditors are necessary 
to attest to the accuracy of financial information based upon the warrants expressed in 
agency theory.  Namely, that self-interested managers will utilize their asymmetric 
supply of financial information and access to company assets to extract company funded 
perquisites.  The rebuttal acts as a counter warrant, specifying at least one condition 
under which the claim is not supported.  Thus, if agency theory is wrong and managers 
usually provide accurate and objective financial information of their performance, then 
auditors are usually not needed.  The qualifier acts as a modifier of the strength of the 
argument or likelihood that the claim follows the data.  In this case, I am not suggesting 
that all managers try to mislead external users of financial information, but that some 




absentee owners.  The sub-claim that auditors are necessary to attest financial 
information becomes that data leading to the claim that auditors serve the public interest.  
This claim is warranted by economic theory and backed by empirical data showing that 
efficient markets increase economic growth and production.  Economic growth and 
production reduces scarcity while increasing aggregate utility among society as a whole. 
In accordance with economic theory, increases in aggregate utility are beneficial to 
society and hence, in the public interest. This claim should always follow unless 
economic theory is wrong, or if auditors do not provide accurate information.  
 
To the extent that accurate and objective information is a function of audit quality, we 
can claim that high quality audits operate in the public interest. DeAngelo (1981) defines 
audit quality as the conditional probability that an auditor will both discover a breach in a 
client’s accounting system and report it.  The ability of an auditor to discover a breach in 
a client’s financial reporting system is based upon the expertise of the auditor. Expertise 
consists of a combination of academic education, client specific knowledge and sufficient 
general professional experience for the auditor to develop the knowledge structures 
necessary to perform an audit. In order to counter the potential rebuttal that auditors are 
not competent, the profession requires rigorous examination of new entrants, usually with 
associated experience requirement, the endorsement of an experienced professional, and 
continuing education requirements to maintain their level of expertise.  However, the 
ability of an auditor to detect a breach in a client’s financial reporting system does not 
guarantee that the auditor will report the breach.  The auditor must also correct or report 




condition to audits serving the public interest. The conditional probability of an auditor 
reporting a breach that they have detected is a measure of auditor independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981). This definition may, in fact, be too simplistic since the efficient 
functioning of capital markets requires not only the production of accurate and timely 
information, but also the perception among investors and creditors that the information is 
objective or unbiased.   
 
The potential rebuttal that auditors lack independence is probably the most significant 
threat to the accounting profession’s ability to maintain its self-regulating monopoly 
status.  This threat arises from the current market-like structure of the profession whereby 
auditors are paid by clients to attest their financial information.  Arguably, the direct 
economic linkage between auditors and their clients provides an incentive to auditors to 
withhold reporting any breaches discovered in a client’s reporting system in order to 
protect their streams of income from audit fees.  In response to this potential rebuttal, the 
profession has developed several arguments that support an auditor’s ability to maintain 
independence despite being directly paid by the client. These mitigating factors include 
auditor’s fear of massive liability from securities litigation and their self-interested 
motivation to protect other preexisting and future audit fees through maintenance of their 
reputational capital (Becker, Defond & Jiambalvo, 1998; Pitt, 1997; DeAngelo, 1981).   
 
The reputational capital argument asserts that firms with multiple income streams from 
audit services will vigorously protect their economic interests by not allowing clients to 




audit firm’s reputation for independence and objectivity.  This argument is warranted by 
the belief that in free markets, clients will only hire auditors with a reputation for high 
quality audits.  To the extent that investors and creditors perceive an auditor to lack 
independence reduces the ex-ante value of the audit to the client and the associated price 
at which they are willing to pay.  Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt (1997) argued “the 
overwhelming economic interest of accounting firms in their reputational capital provides 
a powerful incentive to safeguard independence.”  DeAngelo (1981) argued that the 
client specific quasi-rents auditors earn act as a collateral bond against opportunistic 
behavior and increases audit quality, especially for larger firms who have more at stake 
than smaller firms.  This claim was empirically supported by Becker, Defond & 
Jiambalvo (1998) who found that clients of smaller (non-Big6) auditors report more 
income increasing discretionary accruals than large auditors.  It was also argued that the 
threat of massive liability from securities litigation should serve as a key deterrent to 
improper behavior, ensuring auditor independence and high audit quality (Pitt, 1997).  
This argument was backed by empirical results suggesting that auditors with lower 
(higher) levels of litigation activity represent higher (lower) quality audit suppliers, and 
that smaller (non-big8) audit firms have higher levels of litigation (Palmrose, 1988).   
 
However, these arguments have been seriously challenged in recent years. For example, 
the collapse of Enron erased about $66.5 billion in market capitalization over a matter of 
months, wiping out the life savings of thousands of Enron employees and severely 
damaging the portfolios of millions of other investors. Compounding this tragedy was 




the process and then attempted to conceal or destroy evidence related to the collapse by 
shredding thousands of documents and refusing to testify under oath.   These events 
attacked the core foundational premises underlying any logical claims that the U.S. 
accounting profession (at the very least, Arthur Andersen) was serving the public interest.  
Law enforcement and regulatory institutions were quick to reinforce the argument by 
convicting Arthur Andersen, LLC of obstruction of justice and stripping it of its license 
to audit public companies.  David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of the Enron 
audit, was also criminally charged and subjected to public humiliation in nationally 
televised congressional hearings.  The formality of the congressional setting, the angry 
questioning and the emotional angst on the faces of the accused, all served as persuasive 
rhetoric to reassure a wounded investing public that the regulatory system was properly 
functioning in the public interest, and as a warning to other audit firms that such 
opportunistic behavior would be swiftly and severely punished. 
 
Market failures, such as Enron, illustrate the fact that auditors may not always serve the 
public interest and that capital markets may not always be good for society.  The question 
remains, however, as to whether the public interest rhetoric of the profession represents 
an achievable ideal communicated in good faith, or a cloak for the exploitation of 
investors by large corporate interests and their accounting accomplices. The following 
section explores this alternative perspective and evaluates evidence suggesting that the 
public interest rhetoric may be instrumentally employed to protect the economic interests 






THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS PROPAGANDA 
 
“I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” Adam 
Smith - Wealth of Nations, Chapter 2 
 
 
Collison (2003) argues that large corporate interests have coordinated an extensive 
campaign of propaganda over many years to maintain a climate wherein corporate self-
interest has become an end in itself, often at the expense of larger social interests. 
Essentially, this view suggests that there has been an ongoing campaign through the 
media to convince the public that laissez faire capitalism, the notion of market efficiency 
and the adequacy of accounting measures as symbols of business success promote the 
public interest despite evidence to the contrary.  This perspective represents a challenge 
to the claim that auditors serve the public interest, and the purpose of this section is to 
outline the rebuttal argument. First, I suggest that the overwhelming extent to which the 
profession has cloaked itself in the public interest has created a climate of “taken for 
grantedness”, wherein the concept of the ‘public interest’ has been institutionally 
embedded into the language of both the profession and the investing public, perpetuating 
a façade that shields the self interested core of large corporations from scrutiny. Agents 
of the government and the profession, both witting and unwitting, perpetuate this rhetoric 
in mimetic fashion continuously solidifying the association between the profession and 
the public interest until its use becomes almost invisible and obscured from critical 




profession narrowly defines the term public interest while the public at large tend to 
interpret the phrase in a more socially inclusive sense and argue that the accounting 
profession instrumentally exploits this perceptual difference in meaning to convey a 
sense of goodness regarding its activities to the public at large in order to advance its own 
private interests and the private interests of its corporate and state sponsors.  
 
The term ‘public interest’ as commonly employed in public discourse, usually refers to 
the well being of a community of people.  As such, it constitutes what is referred to as a 
glittering and virtuous generality linked to the highly valued ideals of self-sacrifice and 
benevolence (DOA, 1979).  However, the term also has significant potential for 
alternative meanings.  All too frequently, the audience interprets the meaning of the 
‘public interest’ to be something that is good for them privately as well, even when the 
speaker is referring to a localized public with very specific interests.  This is, according to 
relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), because people cognitively attempt to 
maximize the relevance of a communication according to the belief that it will be 
meaningful, or relate to them personally.  Each member of an audience subjectively 
defines elastic terms such as the ‘public interest’ in context according to his/her own 
personal lived experiences and normative values. This participation by the audience in 
the construction of an argument helps make the ‘public interest’ a powerful rhetorical 
tool that speakers can exploit for instrumental or strategic purposes.   
 
I characterize the U.S. profession’s employment of public interest arguments as 




Rather, the evidence suggests that the profession employs this rhetoric instrumentally in 
an attempt to deflect criticism during times of crisis. Propaganda is defined as the 
intentional spreading of ideas, facts, allegations, rumors or symbols in order to help or 
injure an institution, cause or individual (M-W, 2004).  Linebarger (1948, 1972) classifies 
propaganda as white, grey or black. White propaganda originates from clearly 
identifiable sources while the source of grey propaganda is not clearly identified, and 
black propaganda attempts to intentionally mislead the audience into thinking the source 
is other than the originator.  Another form of propaganda, or more accurately, negative 
propaganda, is censorship.  Censorship is the practice of suppressing or deleting anything 
objectionable in a message. The deletions may be obvious or obscured, and occur either 
at the source of the message or during transmission to the audience.  Enthymemes such as 
“We serve the public interest” incorporate a form of censorship by omitting the 
underlying warrants or sub-claims.  As propaganda, enthymemes are better known as 
slogans, and they can be very effective in moving an audience, even when the underlying 
warrants are refutable.  Thus, claims such as “the accounting profession serves the public 
interest” can be seen as a form of self-evident propaganda, as slogans that are 
simultaneously virtuous and deliberately vague.  The intention is to move the audience 
through emotion while appealing to the authority of the profession, interrupting any 
attempt by the audience to determine whether its application is logical or valid.   
 
Protecting Reputational Capital 
 




while appearing on national television immediately following the congressional hearing 
on Andersen’s role in Enron collapse, where Duncan “pleaded the 5th” and refused to 
answer questions on whether Andersen engaged in wide spread document shredding to 
hide their involvement. In response to the pointed question of whether the accounting 
profession could be trusted, Melancon replied with a classic form of rhetorical 
parallelism known as the tri-colon. “Well, certainly the accounting profession can be 
trusted. This profession has over 100 years of credibility, over 100 years of meeting the 
public interest and, in fact, has been a critical component of the success and 
transparencies of the best capital markets in world here in America2 .”   Note that the first 
two phrases set up the expectation that there will be a third.  The slight change in the 
third phrase renders it more emphatic and highlights the emotional appeal to American 
patriotism.  The fact that American capital markets had been suffering a series of massive 
audit failures over several years wiping out billions of dollars in market capitalization 
was left unstated, leaving the audience to fill in the gap with culturally ingrained warrants 
concerning the benefits of free markets and the value of audits. 
 
The unwanted publicity and public scrutiny that followed these crises motivated the 
accounting profession to launch extensive campaigns of so-called advertorials to bolster 
its image and protect its reputational capital.  However, reconciling the rhetoric of these 
advertorials with the profession’s behavior is again, somewhat problematic.  For 
example, in December 2002, KPMG launched an ad campaign in the Wall Street Journal 
under the title "Regaining Investors' Trust: A Resolution We Plan to Keep" promising to 




Coincidentally, KPMG had just been slapped with a lawsuit by the Missouri Department 
of Insurance for advising General Life Insurance Co. to develop and sell so called ‘Stable 
Value’ funding arrangements that forced its parent, General American Holding Company 
into receivership.  “Among the allegations, the lawsuit claims KPMG concealed 
information, failed to disclose the insurance company's several-billion-dollar liability 
exposure and failed to exercise due care in performing audits. The suit also says KPMG 
tried to cover up its actions during the state's investigation of the company's liquidity 
crisis3.”  The apparent inconsistency between the rhetoric of the advertorial, the context 
in which it was offered and the alleged behavior leads us to classify this campaign as 
propaganda.  In a similar manner, PriceWaterhouseCoopers placed full-page ads in 
January of 2003, under the banner “Stand and be Counted” while simultaneously under 
fire for using aggressive accounting to overstate earnings by $382 million over three 
years at Tyco International. In these ads, PWC proclaimed they would “ask the tough 
questions and tackle the tough issues4” and promised to resign from any audit where they 
had concerns of about the quality of information they were receiving from management.  
As propaganda, the “Stand And Be Counted” campaign attempts to conflate the practice 
of auditing with broader public interest groups through a process of association.  The 
slogan, “Stand And Be Counted” is used by a variety of other public interest groups 
supporting everything from freedom of speech5 to the environment and human rights6.  
The goal of the campaign appears to be self-serving by transferring the positive qualities 
of broader societal concerns to the accounting profession during a time of crisis. 
 




market will punish audit firms for helping CEOs and CFOs manage earnings and extract 
perquisites.  However, the empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between 
auditor reputation, audit quality and marketability may in fact, be inverted.  A pattern of 
hire, fraud, fire and re-hire among the large accounting firms and their corporate clients 
casts doubt on the credibility of this argument.  For example, in October 2001, Xerox 
fired its auditor KPMG, who had helped them overstate earnings by $2 billion over three 
years, replacing them with PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC).  In October 2003, Sprint 
hired KPMG after firing Ernst & Young for selling questionable tax shelters to its CEO 
and CFO. In June 2002, following a $2.5 billion fraud, Adelphia fired Deloitte and 
Touche and hired PWC, yet in January 2004, after allowing a $382 million overstatement 
of earnings, Tyco fired PWC and hired Deloitte and Touche who, incidentally, had just 
been fired by Parmalat after a $5 billion dollar fraud was uncovered there.  Not 
surprisingly, Parmalat replaced Deloitte and Touche with PWC.  The examples seem 
endless, leading one to the conclusion that once a firm demonstrates a willingness and 
ability to help executives manage earnings and/or construct complicated tax shelters, their 
services are in even greater demand by others.  
 
Extending Jurisdictional Claims 
 
Another area where the profession has invoked the public interest argument for self-
serving purposes is with respect to extending its traditional claims beyond the audit 
function. Here the argument is that the provision of consulting services aids the audit 




making them less reliant on a single client.  Pitt (1997) claimed there was no empirical 
evidence that non-audit services harmed audit quality, and that “regulatory concern over 
non-audit services is, at best, unfounded.  At worst, it is contrary to the public interest7.”   
The reasoning Pitt offered was that, “Non-audit services increase the firm’s investment in 
reputational capital, contribute importantly to the quality of audit services and provide 
other benefits to clients and the public8.”   William Balhoff, Chairman of the AICPA 
Public Companies Practice Section, subsequently stated in congressional testimony 
related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that, “to the extent that consulting services provide 
information to management, we are working in the public interest.  We are helping those 
companies, whether they are listed or nonlisted companies, to better run their companies. 
I think that is a public interest 9.”  This statement appears to draw on the 1950’s slogan, 
“What’s good for the country is good for General Motors and vice versa.10”  The 
intention is to argue that despite the massive audit failure at Enron, auditors should be 
allowed to provide consulting services to their clients.   
 
Federal Policy Formation 
 
Perhaps the most influential arena in which the profession has waged its war of 
propaganda is in Congress.  Beginning in the early 1990s, the strategy of the AICPA and 
the Big 5 firms changed from one of dealing with regulators to one of directly influencing 
legislators who were in positions to affect the content of legislation of interest to the 
profession.  During this time, the profession joined in the political action committee 




the profession’s willingness to assume the role of unbiased and objective guide on 
diverse public issues raises questions regarding the extent and execution of their self-
proclaimed public interest responsibilities.  When debating rules and regulations before 
standard setting bodies, the profession argues that exposure to litigation liability serves 
the public interest by providing a deterrent to anti-social behavior while simultaneously 
engaging in a campaign to reduce auditor liability through lobbying efforts and direct 
campaign contributions to legislators.  The U.S. profession’s involvement in federal 
policymaking and contracting has become so intense that the AICPA and the Big four 
firms are now major financial contributors to congressional election campaigns and high-
profile lobbyists (Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003; Dwyer and Roberts, 2004).   
 
One of the first concerted efforts to influence federal legislation having a direct economic 
impact on audit firms was the battle over the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (Avery, 1996).  Roberts, et al. (2003) document the extensive use of PAC 
contributions and lobbying activities that the profession engaged in to secure passage of 
this legislation despite opposition by the attorney’s bar, consumer groups and state 
securities regulators.  This act contained at least two provisions of extreme interest to the 
accounting profession.  The first was the ‘fair-share’ proportionate liability rule that 
helped shield audit firms from the potentially massive liability resulting from large audit 
failures. The second provision provided caps on the actual amount of damages that audit 
firms would be required to pay investors.  Both of these legal provisions appear to 
undermine the strength of the litigation liability argument supporting auditor 





Another example of the profession’s involvement with federal policy making was 
documented by Roberts and Bobek (2004) in the debate over the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997.  Their findings illustrate the inherently political process of tax legislation and the 
differential economic effects these policies have both within and across industries. The 
AICPA announced its role in creating this piece of legislation by “submitting written and 
oral testimony to both houses of Congress and supporting particular provisions of both 
bills with visits to Capital Hill members and staff.”  (Padwe, 1998; pp. 122).   Some 
critics called this legislation a political fraud stating, “The tax bill may be good for some 
clients and at least do no harm to the nation. But the real winners are accountants 
themselves.” (Telberg, 1997).   
 
While the leaders of the CPA profession continue to claim that these activities are part of 
the public accounting profession’s commitment to meet its public interest duty, I submit 
that there is a fundamental difference between providing advice to clients regarding their 
tax situation or financial reporting and providing advice to federal legislators regarding 
the effects of tax and securities litigation legislation. The former falls within the 
profession’s view of client advocacy, while the latter contains far-reaching consequences 
regarding the distribution of economic burdens among various publics to which the 
profession claims to be dedicated to serve.  I also believe the profession’s willingness to 
use its public interest obligation as a justification to support or oppose potential federal 
legislation having a material positive economic impact on its members such arguments 





While the foregoing examples challenge the benevolent motivations of the profession, the 
evidence supporting a presumption of coordinated and pervasive ill-intent is far from 
conclusive.  Moreover, in the following section I suggest that any conclusions regarding 
the intentions of the authors or the meaning of the rhetoric are merely provisional.  Once 
the rhetoric of the public interest ideal is published, the author is no longer in control of 
its meaning.  Rather, the final determination of meaning resides with the audience.  
 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS MYTH 
 
“He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how  
much he is promoting it.” Adam Smith – Wealth of Nations – Chapter 2 
 
The term myth, as I employ it here, should not be interpreted necessarily as imputing 
anything fictional or false, although that is frequently the case.  Rather I use the term to 
refer to the embodiment of ideals and institutions in a society, including its dominant 
political doctrine and extant norms and values.  My concept of myth is based in part on 
De Saussure’s (1959) semiotic scheme as elaborated on by Barthes (1957) and adapted 
by Macintosh (2002) and Puxty (1993). In Saussure’s system of signs, each sign consists 
of two parts: a signifier and a signified.  The signifier is the word or token used to 
indicate the signified.  The signified is the mental image created in the mind of the writer 




independently in a real and objective world, language can be seen as a method for naming 
them. However, Barthes contribution suggests that signifieds become signifiers as soon 
as they are evoked in a second order system of signs.  The new signifiers represent pre-
existing myths or language-objects that consist of their own language material, a 
constellation of signifiers that can be used to create new signs in a never ending chain of 
embedded meaning.  Thus, no final or natural term can ever be stripped from a signifier 
and meaning is never fixed.  
 
For example, the term “accountant” is a signifier referring to the idea of an accountant, 
the signified.  The referent is the actual person.  The idea of an accountant pre-exists in 
the in the mind of the speaker or writer who, drawing from a constellation of signs, utters 
a word or inscribes some symbols onto a medium of communication to be interpreted by 
an audience or reader. The sign also exists as a myth or language–object in the minds 
readers who interpret the sign and create an image in their own mind.  As a language 
object, the myth consists of a constellation of signifiers, each of which can in turn 
represent the final term of the first semiotic system. The word “accountant” is itself 
empty of meaning, and gets ‘filled-up’ with the myth of the clever tax consultant, the 
experienced business consultant or the independent auditor, depending upon the 
interpretation of the reader. As the symbols are interpreted, the meaning of accountant 
shifts instantaneously into any one of the signifiers comprising the myth.  The myth and 
its associated signifiers can then become the first terms in a second order semiotic system 
giving rise to new signs, and so on.  For example, in continuing the semiotic chain, the 




working entrepreneurs avoid the excessive demands of the state, or the independent 
auditor who ensures fair play among market participants. Following this chain of 
meaning, the signifier ‘accountant’ embodies a constellation of elements, including the 
politics of capitalism, the institutions of free markets, the standards of reliable financial 
reporting and the professional ideals of competence, independence and objectivity.  
Alternative chains of meaning, however, can be found in the underprivileged signifiers 
simultaneously embedded in the myth.  These signifiers are represented as the binary 
opposites of the privileged signifiers. Rather than clever tax consultant or independent 
auditor, “accountant” may be interpreted as the shifty servant of greedy and exploitive 
corporations paid to help them evade their legitimate social responsibilities and exploit 
investors.  Regardless, once invoked the meaning of the signified can shift sideways one 
way or the other, becoming the signifier in a subsequent chain of meaning.  Determining 
which perspective is the “Truth” remains undecidable.  Is the accountant a pedant 
bookkeeper, a professional auditor, a clever consultant or an unimaginative bean-counter? 
What grounds do we have for our faith in the reality of the referent, or in our ability to 
accurately interpret the intention in mind of the writer?  My argument suggests that 
language contains no transcendental “Truth”, only localized truths within particular 
discourses, yet these ideas are immanent to our language and dominate the way we 
understand.   
 
Identifying the referent of the ‘public interest’, assuming it is real, is more problematic.  
The Miriam-Webster Dictionary Online reports no less than 28 entries for ‘public’ and 13 




meaning or referent.  In the case of the public interest, it appears the sign has become the 
master, not the servant.   As a language-object, the public interest ideal is associated with 
multiple, simultaneous and contradictory myths.   
 
Theories of linguistic relativity suggest that different groups, each with their own unique 
history and knowledge structures, will create different linguistic codes and meanings that 
in turn, mediate the perceptual cognitive processes group members use to define their 
social environment (Belkaoui, 1995; Belkaoui, 1980).  At its limit, this thesis suggests the 
lexical register of a language directly limits the cognitive ability of speakers to organize 
their thoughts.  This is based on the assertion that all thinking goes on in language, that 
language may distort thinking and that languages differ in the thoughts they afford us. 
That is, the words and symbols contained in a language and privileged in discursive 
practices directly enable, influence and constrain the thoughts of its users. Thus, the 
discursive practices of different social groups will create multiple referents of the public 
interest ideal depending upon how the myth is privileged within their lexical register.   
 
Typical discourse in the accounting profession privileges the myth that auditors serve the 
public interest by ensuring accurate and reliable financial reports that provide critical 
information necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets.  On the other hand, 
discourse in law privileges the myth that lawyers serve the public interest by providing 
free legal services to the indigent, poor and persecuted while discourse in medicine 
privileges the myth that doctors serve the public interest by monitoring and safeguarding 




for ill and aged.  A plethora of other groups also purport to serve the public interest by 
raising social consciousness on issues of free speech, the environment, preventing child 
and spousal abuse or supporting human rights, etc.  Once we understand the public 
interest ideal as a collection of privileged myths, and as such, value laden and temporary, 
we can attempt to demystify it through a deconstructive reading.  
 
Deconstruction as Method 
 
Deconstruction is a theory of reading that aims to undermine the logic of opposition 
within a text. Forged in the writings of Jacques Derrida (1982) a deconstructive reading 
presupposes that meaning is unstable and attempts to ‘unpack’ a text in order to 
understand the rhetorical steps taken to arrive at its central meaning.  Developing a clear 
and coherent discussion of deconstruction as a methodology for the social sciences is 
problematic since precise definitions are antithetical to its fundamental assumptions 
regarding knowledge and discourse. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to 
describe Derrida’s project and incorporate deconstruction into their epistemological 
arsenal, most notably by proponents of the poststructuralist critique (Macintosh, 2002; 
Truex, Baskerville & Travis, 2000; Kilduff, 1993; Cooper, 1989; Cooper & Burrell, 
1988).    
 
The value of deconstruction seems to be in its ability to reveal the simultaneous and 
contradictory attitudes present in a specific text or discourse and the inherent instability 




Knowledge and Truth are not assumed to exist externally in a ‘real’ world. Rather, they 
are recognized by what they are not.  Words are recognized and interpreted according to 
their metaphysical relationship to all other words in a language.  This conscious 
recognition and interpretation is a result of, or an effect of, what Derrida refers to as 
Differánce.  
 
Differánce is a crucial word-concept of Derrida’s process of deconstruction.  However, 
differánce is difficult to understand, if not impossible to discuss. Derrida coined the term 
based on a pun that seems amusing only in the original French in which he discusses it.  
Differénce (with an é) is a French homonym, meaning both to differ (spatially) and to 
defer (temporally). Differánce (with an á) is a homophone that Derrida created in 
philosophical discourse as a textual illustration of the metaphysical cleavage between 
thoughts.  At risk of oversimplifying this word-concept, and at risk of falling into the 
bottomless pit of metaphysical discourse, I describe differánce as ‘not’ or ‘naught’, and 
as such, a ‘knot’. Metaphysically, differánce may refer to the cleavage between mind and 
soul that allows the emergence of consciousness, or the perception of Being.  However, 
since the “perception of Being” implies a spatial and temporal difference between mind 
and soul, consciousness must exist as a third party observer.  In this third party status as 
observer, consciousness is both mind and soul while simultaneously being neither.  
 
The idea then of differánce is an attempt to describe the imperceptible and inaudible 
space between ideas, sounds or words that allow us to differentiate them as being 




then it would become a mid-point between two concepts, creating a new idea that is itself 
only an effect of differánce. Derrida’s pun of substituting the á in differánce further 
illustrates this cleavage between thought and language, and between speaking and 
writing, in text, but not in speech.  The á represents the not/naught between symbols and 
the undecidability, or ambivalence of language.  
 
Deconstruction recognizes and embraces the ambivalence of language, the simultaneous 
and contradictory manner in which meaning is inscribed and ascribed to text. For 
example, we can define light and dark in binary opposition to one another, yet they merge 
together in the middle of a dusky continuum. Likewise, life and death stand in opposition 
to one another, yet chemical processes continue and cells divide while doctors and clerics 
debate the precise moment of termination.  The process of a deconstructive reading is 
fluid and challenges the privileged myths, opening up space for repressed or marginalized 
interpretations.  Thus, a deconstructive reading lends itself to critique. Definitions are 
unstable and meaning is ultimately undecidable because differánce always allows the 
opening up of another space between meanings, providing a jumping off point for new 
meaning in unknown directions.  Symbols are inscribed by writers in a process of 
reflection and subsequently interpreted by readers who ascribe new or expanded 
meanings to them.  These in turn, are disseminated within a community in new 
directions, threading through and beyond the original idea or memory trace present in the 
mind of the author, creating ongoing chains of signification that seem to take on lives of 
their own much like the stalks, stems and flowers of a plant.  The fruitions of which are 




yet conceived. Cooper (1989; p488) uses the metaphor of ideas being transported in “a 
vehicle that has no substance, by a driver whom one cannot see, and to a destination that 
one can never know.”    Metaphors are useful here because they describe through 
analogy, illustration and example, yet they ‘prove’ nothing.  At best, they provide a 
perspective from which to understand a problem.  The main point being that, it is not the 
destination of the vehicle, or the color of the flower that is important.  Rather, it is the 
process of recognition. Meaning is always on the move.  
 
Deconstructing the public interest 
 
Given the assumptions of differánce and undecidability, how can a deconstruction of the 
public interest ideal proceed?   The word seems to imply some sort of reverse 
engineering, or taking apart.  However, any attempt to define deconstruction by fixing it 
in place and establishing rigid procedures for its method is antithetical to its philosophical 
underpinnings. Specifying an ordered set of procedures merely privileges one hierarchy 
over another that can, and should, in turn, be deconstructed.  One might also ask, “What 
are the correct procedures for appreciating a work of art?”  Can such “procedures” even 
be articulated? Even if they can, the “procedures” that work for one observer, listener, or 
type of art may differ from one another.  Consider for example, the popular optical 
illusion of the old woman and the young woman. By concentrating on a particular pattern 
in the illusion, an image of an old woman’s face covered in a scarf may emerge.  
Alternatively, a viewer may see a young woman in a shawl. Usually, only one pattern can 




the alternative rendition. The body of one image is simultaneously the outline of the 
other, and privileging one picture distracts our attention, pushing the other image into the 
background.  Differánce then, can be described as the process of deferring a pattern of 
differences.  Deconstruction is differánce in action, a way of seeing those things deferred 
out of our awareness by our concentration on the privileged picture. Regardless of the 
procedures given, some people, no matter how long they look at the illusion, will see only 
one picture and not the other.  
 
Nevertheless, in following Macintosh (2002) and Truex, et al (2000), I will attempt to 
deconstruct the public interest by developing alternative semiotic chains of meaning, each 
privileging different assumptions leading to different and admittedly, only provisional 
conclusions. As a first step I identify and arrange crucial words (signifiers) surrounding 
the public interest ideal into a metaphysical hierarchy, juxtaposing them against their 
binary opposites such that one side is privileged as being better than the other. For the 
public interest, this binary opposite might be identified as private gain.   
 
The public interest is usually associated with the common concerns of a community of 
people, country or locality. As such it represents a reified signifier of the aggregate 
concerns, claims and interests of a society as opposed to an individual. As a second or 
third order semiotic symbol, the public interest can also be associated with a constellation 
of words that surround and intersect its meaning.  These might include words like self-
sacrifice, benevolence, good, and perhaps, ultimately, God. As an aggregation of 




interests of a single individual or possibly even a subset of individuals. The individual is 
subservient to the public, and in this privileged position, the public has the right to 
demand sacrifice from the individual for the welfare of the whole. The privileged 
assumption also holds that it is the public’s disposition to do good for itself by providing 
greater aggregate happiness, well-being and prosperity to its members.  Likewise, 
benevolence, as it is commonly interpreted, is the value of gifting this sacrifice to the 
community out of kindness. However, it also has etymological roots as the compulsory 
levy made by English kings having no other authority than the claim of prerogative. 
Thus, at its limit, this semiotic chain might end in the aggregation of all humanity, 
signified by God, who created Man in His image, and by whose Word, Man must live. 
 
At this point, I can also reveal the negatively associated semiotic chain of reasoning that 
marginalizes private gain to the public interest. The word-objects surrounding this 
semiotic chain might include self-seeking, greed and evil. Private gain, as the self-sought 
relative increases in advantage, privilege and resources acquired by individuals does not 
in and of itself necessarily connote something negative.  However, given the assumptions 
of resource scarcity, it can be argued that to the extent self-sought accumulation of 
advantages is excessive and made at the expense of other members, that private gain is 
somehow reprehensible.  Onto-theologically, the proclivity for excessive and 
reprehensible acquisitiveness is known as greed, a sin that spawns covetous retaliation by 
the less privileged and disturbs the order of society.  In contrast the public interest reifies 






In the second step, I reverse the hierarchy by privileging the opposite side of the public 
interest argument.  In this way, I can derive a different constellation of signifiers that 
privilege private gain. These signifiers, grounded in the cultural values of freedom and 
individualism, exist in a chain of reasoning that justifies the rationality of capitalism and 
the productive and distributive efficiencies of the market. Under this perspective, 
privately gained privilege and advantage are produced through an ethic of individual 
effort and ability.  To the extent that these advantages arise independently, the individual 
responsible for their creation has right to their ownership, including all future production 
arising from them.  The extension of property rights to the future production of 
individually created advantage also rationalizes the potential unlimited accumulation of 
wealth. As the underprivileged binary opposite of private gain, the public interest 
marginalizes the collective against the individual, socialism against capitalism and state 
sponsored paternalism against individual freedom. This semiotic chain of reasoning 
might demonize the state by portraying taxation and regulation as unnecessary intrusions 
on the inalienable right of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These 
arguments may also be warranted by economic theory and backed by empirical evidence 
that state regulated economies have proven unduly restrictive and inefficient in allocating 
resources. Ultimately, this perspective believes in the morality of the market, the 
aggregation of private interests as the common good and elevates the rationality and 
achievement of the individual over the state.  Maintenance of this perspective also 
requires the protection of capitalistic institutions, such as free markets, personal property 





The third and final step of my deconstruction reveals how any fixed meaning is 
unsustainable.  I can argue that the myths of capitalism and market efficiency are 
unsustainable due to the unrealistic assumptions the underlying economic theory. Among 
these is the assumption that market participants have perfect information regarding all 
existing and potential stocks of resources as well as each other’s respective utility 
functions.  Compounding this shortcoming is the vagueness of the notion of utility and 
the inadequacy of currency as its proxy measure.  Utility is a somewhat unclear notion 
equivalent to satisfaction or the preference by individuals for some goods, tangible or 
intangible, over others. However, even given the assumption that we could somehow 
measure utility, the notion that it can be rank ordered, traded and consumed attributes 
properties to it that simply do not exist. For example, happiness, satisfaction and love are 
all components of utility, yet they are not diminished by their consumption or devalued 
by their accumulation. Thus, the nature of utility contradicts the fundamental assumptions 
of scarcity and diminishing marginal valuation and undermines any rationality for its 
exchange.   
 
Unfortunately, this argument suffers from flaws in its assumptions as well.  The 
legitimacy of any inference as to what the true interests at stake are can be challenged 
both subjectively and objectively.  I can argue that economic theory is not meant to be a 
depiction of reality; that it’s true value lies in its ability to predict human behavior and 
that it’s assumptions are merely convenient simplifications oriented toward that end.  




simultaneously confirm our greatest hope and our worst fear: Economic man is 
predictably amoral.  Fortunately, economic man is only a theoretical reification of a 
pattern of behavior that can in turn be deferred.  In differánce, we see the evolution of the 
state as a mechanism to correct for this moral deficiency using the public interest as 
justification.   
 
Pleasence and Maclean (1998) describe the public interest as a hopelessly ambiguous 
term with practical difficulties in establishing both its nature and magnitude.  The public 
is first reified from the abstract and defined as a thing in itself, much like the term 
“American”. Thus, any interest attributed to the public is not any form of shared interest, 
but an interest of a defined public of indeterminate size and composition.  
Notwithstanding the phantasmic reification of a public as a collection of individuals, the 
distinction of “interests” also eludes us in the process of differánce.  Ideological interests 
represent interests in moral values while material interests are more concerned with 
property and consumption.  However, in the ambivalence of differánce, material interests 
that are considered vital or concerned with subsistence simultaneously become 
ideological interests in their effect on the extent or character of the public’s existence.  
 
Since language offers only crude approximations, a precise articulation of the public 
interest is unavailable.  However, the listening mind needs totality, relevance and closure, 
and so draws on conscious and unconscious memory traces acquired from lived 
experience to complete the sign and create the myth.  Existentially, the public interest 




interpreted and extended.  The public interest is imagined and a unique meaning is 
impressed upon the mind of the audience. The deconstruction of the public interest then, 
results in virtually whomever, and whatever the speaker intends during the context of any 
specific discourse.   Moreover, since the intent of a speaker cannot be accurately 
formulated and transmitted through language, the public interest simultaneously becomes 




The purpose of this paper was to explore the nature of accounting profession’s rhetoric 
regarding its public interest ideal.  In the first section, I presented the logical argument, 
consistent with the functionalist perspective that auditors serve the public interest by 
maintaining the orderly functioning of commerce. These claims are warranted by the 
theories of agency and neo-classical economics, backed by empirical observation and 
qualified to the extent that auditors are both competent and independent.  In support of 
auditor independence, I presented the arguments that both the auditor’s economic interest 
in their reputational capital and their fear of massive liability arising from litigation 
motivate them to remain independent and objective in their financial reporting.  These 
arguments rely on the widely held belief among the American investing audience that a 
free market will ‘weed-out’ or punish firms that engage in anti-social behavior.  I also 




firms in public displays of interrogation and humiliation. 
 
In the second section, I presented evidence that indicates the leaders of the accounting 
profession and their agents instrumentally perpetuate the myth of the public interest ideal 
through slogans, advertorial campaigns and white papers in order to maintain their status 
as a self-regulating monopoly.  In rebuttal to the neoclassical economic arguments, I 
presented evidence that in the market for audit services, a firm’s economic interest in 
their reputational capital does not necessarily mitigate pro-management and anti-social 
behavior, at least for the largest accounting firms.  Despite having been implicated in 
numerous financial frauds and questionable tax shelters, the reputations of the Big Four 
firms seems intact as evidenced by their continuing ability to secure large audit 
engagements and sell new services. Following a crisis the lead partners and executives 
clumsy enough to “get caught” are singled out for punishment and public humiliation 
while the profession responds with a multi-pronged campaign of propaganda to bolster its 
image and restore its reputation.  They accomplish this by resigning from engagements, 
blaming individual partners and CEOs, running massive advertorial campaigns and 
swapping clients among themselves in a highly concentrated monopolistic market.  
Treating each audit failure as an isolated incident of individual greed perpetrated under 
the guise of responsible professional stewardship simply protects the reputation of the 
profession allowing it to retain its self regulating status and continue to extract monopoly 
rents from the market. Likewise, in undermining the argument that massive liability from 
securities litigation ensures auditor independence, we see the profession invoking the 




provisions and caps on litigation damages.  They accomplish this by providing written 
and oral testimony, paying direct cash contributions to legislators, visiting the offices of 
Congressmen and their staff and making emotional appeals to the public through the 
business media.   
 
In the final analysis, I illustrate that the profession’s claim of public service is 
undecidable.  This is because the public interest is emotionally loaded word with little or 
no rational content.  When used before a receptive audience, the ‘public interest’ can act 
as a virtuous word with significant potential to transfer positive qualities to the 
accounting profession and create favorable associations between past or pending events 
and the audience’s personal welfare.  However, if delivered before a cynical audience, 
this strategy can backfire. The logical arguments supporting the accounting profession’s 
claim of public service can be refuted, exposing the rhetoric as an attempt to 
instrumentally manipulate an unsuspecting audience.  Thus my provisional conclusion is 
an admonishment to the accounting profession.  In order to be effective, the rhetoric of 
the public interest must be used in a manner consistent with the expectations of the 
audience and it would be a mistake to underestimate the depth of their perception.  Hatch 
(1988) warns speakers  that, “Americans admire professionals for their dedication to 
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1 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct Section 52, Article II 
2 Transcript of Barry Melancon on January 24, 2002 CNBC Broadcast posted on the AICPA web site 
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